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Bush Writes Off Congress, Takes Reins in War, Law: Some Question the
Constitutionality of the President's Decision to Fight Terrorism on U.S. Soil His
Way, Without Lawmakers' Approval.
Los Angeles Times
December 10, 2001
David G. Savage
The message from the Senate Democrats
to the Bush White House last week was:
Let's be partners in the war against
terrorism.
"That's how the founders and our
Constitution intended it. Under our
system, none of us has a monopoly on
authority," Judiciary Committee Chairman
Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) told Atty. Gen.
John Ashcroft.
The American people will have greater
confidence if the rules for this new war
are "undertaken by partners in our
country's effort against a common and
terrible enemy," said Leahy, the
Democrats' point man.
The Bush team responded with a clear but
polite "No, thank you."
"The constitutional founders didn't expect
us to have a war conducted by
committee," Ashcroft told his former
Judiciary Committee colleagues. "The
Constitution vests the president with the
extraordinary and sole authority, as
commander in chief, to lead our nation in
times of war."
The back-and-forth exchange at a
committee hearing Thursday illustrated
the growing power struggle playing out in
Washington over a war whose boundaries
are yet to be drawn.
No one has questioned the president's
authority to send U.S. troops into battle in
Afghanistan. But controversy has arisen
over a series of orders issued by President
Bush and his attorney general that expand
the government's power to fight terrorism
at home--from detaining hundreds of
foreigners to holding military tribunals to
prosecute noncitizens.
Truman's Action in 1952 Was Overruled
On the question of presidential authority,
the Republicans' favorite role model is
Democratic President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. During World War II,
Roosevelt ordered the detention of
Japanese Americans on the West Coast
and a secret military trial for eight Nazi
saboteurs who had landed on the Atlantic
beaches.
The wartime experience of FDR's
successor, however, and the legal
precedent it set for a foreign-domestic
delineation of presidential power, is often
forgotten.
In 1952, with U.S. troops fighting in
Korea, President Harry S. Truman seized
control of the nation's steel mills when
unions went on strike and ordered military
troops to keep the mills operating. The
president cited his powers as commander
in chief, but the Supreme Court ruled he
had gone too far.
Justice Robert H. Jackson, who had
served under FDR, said the president's
wartime power is limited on the home
front, especially when he acts on his own.
Truman had not asked for congressional
approval before seizing the mills.
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"We should not use this occasion to
circumscribe, much less contract, the
lawful role of the President as
Commander in Chief," Jackson wrote. "I
should indulge [him] the widest latitude . .
. to command the [military], at least when
turned against the outside world for the
security of our society. But when it is
turned inward, it should have no such
indulgence. His command power is not
such an absolute, . . . but is subject to
limitations consistent with a constitutional
Republic whose law and policy-making
branch is a representative Congress."
Nevertheless, Bush and his advisors are
determined to fight terrorism on their
own terms and without interference by
Congress.
And so long as the public strongly
supports the president's efforts, Congress
is unlikely to stand in the way, or even
demand a voice in making policy. Concern
for civil liberties aside, the political risk of
appearing to side with the terrorists could
be too high.
On Sept. 14, just three days after the
terrorist attacks, Congress passed a
broadly worded resolution authorizing
Bush to "use all necessary and appropriate
force" to retaliate and to "prevent any
future acts" of international terrorism.
Since then, the government has detained
more than 1,200 suspects and refused to
say who they are and why they are being
held. New rules allow federal agents to
listen in on some jailhouse conversations
between these suspects and their lawyers.
Ashcroft has increased FBI surveillance of
groups that might have links to terrorists.
And the White House has said it may use
military tribunals to prosecute some
noncitizens charged with terrorism
offenses.
Grudgingly, Ashcroft negotiated with
Leahy to win congressional approval of
counter-terrorism legislation. But on other
efforts--including the military trials--the
administration has said that it can proceed
without the approval of Congress.
"We're fighting a war," Bush said last
week about the military tribunals. "I need
to have that extraordinary option at my
fingertips."
The Senate Democrats say they can see a
need for this "extraordinary option" but
do not see why it should not be
established-- and restricted--by law.
On Capitol Hill, this dispute is partisan
and personal.
The Senate Judiciary Committee has been
the scene of bitter battles between liberals
and conservatives and, as the GOP
senator from Missouri, Ashcroft was one
of its most aggressively conservative
members.
When Bush chose him as attorney general,
all but one of Ashcroft's former
Democratic colleagues voted against him.
17isconsin's Sen. Russell D. Feingold said
he knew Ashcroft personally and did not
think he would be the firebrand that
critics had conjured up.
Since Sept. 11, however, Feingold has
emerged as Ashcroft's sharpest critic in
the Senate, and during Thursday's hearing,
they engaged in several frosty exchanges.
Ashcroft also has a testy relationship with
Leahy. During the Clinton years, Leahy
chafed at the moves by Ashcroft and
other conservative Republicans to block
the president's nominees to the federal
courts. This year, the two have switched
sides, and Leahy and the Democrats are
blocking a series of Bush nominees.
Many Disapprove of Military Tribunals
In general, the senators have mastered the
art of smiling through clenched teeth. But
on the historic and controversial questions
surrounding the nation's response to the
74
Sept. 11 attacks, Bush administration
officials have generated animosity by
making clear that they are not interested in
collaborating with Congress.
White House lawyers have been
determined to assert the president's legal
power. They wrote the Nov. 13 order
authorizing military trials and gave it an
unusually broad reach.
It allows the president to detain and try in
military court noncitizens if they have
"engaged in, aided or abetted, or
conspired to commit" acts of terrorism.
The order also appeared to close the
courthouse door to any appeals. "Military
tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction"
over these individuals, and they may not
"seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding . . in any court of the United
States."
More recently, Ashcroft and other
administration officials have said that they
plan to use military trials for "war crimes"
only, and probably only for terrorists
captured abroad.
During Thursday's hearing, Leahy
announced that he had drafted legislation
to allow limited use of the military trials.
Sens. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and
Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) also said
they were interested in pressing a bill that
would authorize the military trials.
"We should pass an authorizing resolution
that really gives you, as the executive
branch, the authority to do what you need
and also states some things like the
standard of proof, like whether it's open
or partially closed [and] the right to
counsel," Feinstein said.
But the administration's lawyers said
privately that they were not interested in
help from the Democrats.
"They have decided they are not going to
stand in the road and block the way" on
tribunals, but "now they want to get in the
front seat and drive," one administration
official said after the hearing.
Dispute Over Power in Wartime Not
New
This clash also reflects a profound and
recurring constitutional dispute over who
has the power to set the rules in wartime.
The Constitution seems to give authority
to Congress. It says, "Congress shall have
the power to declare war ... and to make
rules concerning captures on land and
water." Congress also has the power "to
define and punish . . . offenses against the
law of nations . . . [and] to constitute
tribunals inferior to the United States."
In contrast to these broad rule-making
powers of Congress, the president is
described as the executive who carries out
the rules. "The President shall be the
commander in chief of the Army and
Navy," the Constitution says, and "he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."
But over two centuries of American
history, the balance of power has shifted
toward the president. After World War II
and the advent of nuclear weapons, it was
commonly said that the president needed
the power to go to war instantly, without
waiting for congressional approval.
And, despite much debate and hand
wringing, Congress has not moved
aggressively to assert its own authority.
This fall, when the White House took up
the idea of military trials, the president
and his advisors did not even bother to
tell members of Congress, let alone ask
for their approval or input.
In this instance, the president's
conservative lawyers, who usually are
devoted to the Constitution's "original
meaning," are believers in the evolving
Constitution. Regardless of what was
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Ashcroft Defends Anti-Terrorism Steps;
Civil Liberties Groups' Attacks 'Only Aid Terrorists,' Senate Panel Told
The Washington Post
December 7, 2001
Dan Eggen
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft
resolutely defended the Justice
Department's anti-terrorism tactics
yesterday, telling a Senate committee the
measures are necessary to prevent future
attacks and suggesting that criticism of
them aids the terrorist cause.
Peppered by congressional skepticism but
bolstered by overwhelming public support
in recent weeks, Ashcroft appeared before
the Senate Judiciary Committee to
champion Bush administration strategies
since the Sept. 11 attacks. The methods
include the detention of hundreds of
foreign nationals and plans to try alleged
terrorists and their accomplices before
military tribunals.
Ashcroft accused unidentified critics of
exaggerating or mischaracterizing
administration policies, saying the Justice
Department "has sought to prevent
terrorism with reason, careful balance and
excruciating attention to detail."
"We need honest, reasoned debate, not
fear-mongering," Ashcroft said. "To those
who scare peace-loving people with
phantoms of lost liberty, my message is
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for
they erode our national unity and diminish
our resolve. They give ammunition to ...
enemies and pause to . . . friends."
Ashcroft's bold language prompted
protest from interest groups, who, along
with some in Congress, have criticized
government tactics as civil liberties
infringements. But Judiciary Committee
members were circumspect in
comparison, confining most questions to
specific policy issues and appearing
reticent to pick a public fight with an
attorney general leading a popular anti-
terror campaign. The most spirited debate
centered not on terrorism but on gun
policy, as several Democratic senators
criticized Ashcroft for preventing the FBI
from checking whether some of the
hundreds of people detained in the post-
Sept. 11 investigation had sought to
purchase guns in the United States.
Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy (D-
Vt.), who has complained about a lack of
Senate input into the anti-terror program,
said he planned to continue offering
congressional guidelines for conducting
military tribunals, despite little apparent
support for the idea among Senate and
House leaders.
"This is not a question of whether you are
for or against terrorists," Leahy said after
the hearing. "Everyone is against
terrorists. This is about whether we are
adequately protecting civil liberties."
Civil liberties advocates were similarly
unhappy with Ashcroft's suggestions that
skepticism about the anti-terror plan is
unwarranted while the nation is at war.
"It is sad that the attorney general treats
honest criticism as un-American and
unpatriotic," said Georgetown University
law professor Samuel Dash, a Democrat
who served as the Senate Watergate
Committee's chief counsel. "These are
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fear - tactics that chill debate. President
Nixon also treated critics as enemies."
Committee Republicans rallied around
their former colleague. Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch (Utah), the ranking GOP member
who helped Ashcroft win his contentious
confirmation last January, praised
Ashcroft's performance since Sept. 11 and
decried the "hysterical concerns" of some
detractors.
"Certainly the American people are not
watching us quibble about whether we
should provide more rights than the
Constitution requires to the criminals and
terrorists who are devoted to killing our
people," Hatch said. "They are interested
in making sure that we protect our
country against terrorist attacks."
Ashcroft, a conservative former U.S.
senator whose appointment as attorney
general was bitterly opposed by Leahy and
most other Senate Democrats, has
emerged as one of the key figures in the
Bush administration's war on terronsm.
He pushed Congress to quickly approve
legislation in October that expanded the
ability of law enforcement ancLintelligence
agencies to tap phones, monitor Internet
traffic and conduct other forms of
surveillance in pursuit of terrorists.
shcroft has also issued administrative
rules allowing the monitoring of privileged
communications between attorneys and
detainees who are suspected terrorists;
ordered prosecutors to seek interviews
with more than 5,000 young, mostly
Middle Eastern men visiting the United
States; and has presided over a broad
national effort to detain hundreds of
foreign nationals accused of immigration
violations or minor crimes -- but has
refused to identify most of them or reveal
information about many of their cases.
The government also has threatened to
deport or jail illegal immigrants who
decline to cooperate with authorities,
while offering visas and potential
citizenship to those who provide
information on terrorist networks.
The measures have proven popular with
the public, which, polls show,
overwhelringly favors military tribunals
and aggressive detention policies. But the
effort has prompted rising condemnation
from civil liberties groups, Arab American
organizations and a vocal minority in the
House and Senate. Yesterday's appearance
before Leahy's panel was the latest in a
string of public appearances and
interviews in which Ashcroft responded
to the criticism.
In his testimony, Ashcroft said the
monitoring of attorney-client
communications, which applies to just 16
federal prisoners, requires the government
to notify the targets beforehand and
prohibits use of the information by
prosecutors or law enforcement agents
except to forestall an inuinent terrorist
attack.
Ashcroft also rejected complaints that
some detainees do not have adequate legal
representation or have been prevented
from seeking counsel. One man detained
for nearly two months, Yemeni citizen Ali
Maqtari, testified earlier this week that he
was allowed minimal contact with his
attorney and family, and was threatened
by investigators while in custody.
Authorities say he is innocent. But
Ashcroft, holding a "terrorist manual"
allegedly used by Osama bin Laden's al
Qaeda network, warned that terrorists are
instructed to concoct stories of
mistreatment and otherwise use the
nation's open society to their advantage in
planning and staging attacks. "In this
manual, al Qaeda terrorists are now told
how to use America's freedom as a
weapon against us," Ashcroft said. "We
are at war with an enemy that abuses
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individual rights as it abuses jetliners. It
abuses those rights to make weapons of
them with which to kill Americans."
Ashcroft strongly defended Bush's order
allowing military tribunals, though he
referred specific questions about how the
courts would be run to Defense Secretary
Donald i Rumsfeld, who would oversee
the systern.
In offering a promise of "full and fair
proceedings," Ashcroft joined
administration officials who have sought
to reassure lawmakers that the tribunals
would be used in narrow circumstances
involving alleged war criminals. But
Ashcroft also acknowledged that the order
can be applied to any noncitizen, allows
proceedings to be held in secret and
provides for indefinite detention of
alleged war criminals. Nonetheless,
criticism of the plan is overblown,
Ashcroft said, and "charges of kangaroo
courts and shredding the Constitution
give new meaning to the term 'the fog of
war.
But while several Democratic senators,
including Russell Feingold (Wis.) and
Edward M. Kennedy (Mass.), expressed
misgivings about some the anti-terror
tactics, there were relatively few heated
exchanges between them and Ashcroft. In
response to his suggestion that criticism
might aid terrorists, Feingold asked
Ashcroft for "assurance that you do not
consider the hearings that we have been
holding . .. as . . . somehow aiding the
terrorists by eroding national unity."
Ashcroft responded: "I did indicate that
we need reasoned discourse as opposed to
fear mongering. And I think that's fair.
This is the place where reasoning and
discourse take place."
Staff writer Jim McGee contributed to this
report.
Copyright © 2001 The Washington Post
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Liberty and the Pursuit of Terrorists
The Washington Post
November 25, 2001
Charles Lane
If civil libertarians of the left and right
agree on anything, it is this: In its war
against terrorism, the Bush administration
is about to trample the Constitution, and
with it, our personal freedoms. The Justice
Department's plan to eavesdrop on
selected conversations between federal
detainees and their attorneys is
"terrifying," says Laura Murphy of the
liberally oriented American Civil Liberties
Union. President Bush's potentially secret
anti-terronsm military tribunals are
Stalinist, says William Safire, the
conservatively inclined New York Times
columnist.
Sincere as it may be, this criticism is
overblown. There's no need, or reason, to
discuss the threat to liberty posed by the
U.S. government in the same breath as the
threat posed by terrorism itself.
Viewed strictly in legal and constitutional
terms, the Bush approach does raise
troubling questions. If the administration
makes aggressive use of the new
wiretapping, detention and intelligence-
gathering powers granted to it by
Congress, as Attorney General John
Ashcroft has pledged, more people would
likely be prosecuted and punished than
would have been the case under pre-Sept.
11 laws. And they may be jailed or
otherwise deprived of their rights with less
due process than before.
But viewed as the latest chapter in the
long-running American story about how
to balance security and liberty in wartime
a story that dates back to the early days
of the republic -- today's anti-terror
crackdown seems quite defensible, even
moderate. Moreover, if the past is any
guide, the long-term consequence of a
U.S. victory in the current war could well
be more freedom and tolerance, both here
and abroad.
There are no certain templates when it
comes to managing the trade-off between
safety and freedom. The Constitution has
been a consideration for past war
presidents, but not necessarily a more
important one than the perceived gravity
of the threat the country faced. Without
an act of Congress, President Abraham
Lincoln suspended the right to seek
habeas corpus (an ancient judicial writ
designed to free the wrongly imprisoned)
during the Civil War, and authorized
military trials for alleged draft resisters or
Southern sympathizers. Lincoln believed
he had to go above and beyond the
Constitution to preserve the Republic,
without which the Constitution itself
would be a dead letter. "Are all the laws
but one to go unexecuted," he asked his
critics in the dark days of 1861, "and the
government itself to go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?"
Twentieth-century presidents embraced
Lincoln's logic. Woodrow Wilson let
Socialist Party leader Eugene V. Debs be
prosecuted and jailed for publicly
opposing the World War I draft; Wilson's
postmaster general drove antiwar
newspapers out of business by denying
them access to the mails. Following
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin
D. Roosevelt ordered the internment of
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120,000 people of Japanese ancestry, most
of them U.S. citizens.
Historians still debate the legitimacy of
these decisions. Lincoln's have generally
been vindicated; Wilson's and FDR's have
not. What's striking today, though, is that
nothing like these measures is even
contemplated. Bush's response is
comparatively well-tailored to a clearly
urgent threat. The Justice Department has
held hundreds of suspects from Muslim
countnes m secret detention and has
ordered the questioning of 5,000 other
recent arrivals. This has a whiff of ethnic
profiling about it. But the government has
a plausible legal claim -- a visa violation,
usually -- for holding most of the
detainees. And the president, joined by
political leaders of all parties and regions,
has gone out of his way to urge tolerance.
Lincoln's military tribunals tried U.S.
citizens, sometimes for little more than
antiwar speech. By contrast, the military
trials Bush authorized two weeks ago are
aimed at non-citizens directly involved in
terrorism, or who may be captured in
battle. Bush made that decision after the
failure of more legalistic pre-Sept. 11
approaches to terrorism. The Clinton
administration emphasized prosecution in
civilian courts; former national security
adviser Sandy Berger has said that he
could not accept a 1996 offer by Sudan to
hand over Osama bin Laden because FBI
officials believed there wasn't enough
evidence to indict him in federal court.
U.S. juries did eventually convict several
bin Laden underlings, but only after long
trials in which delicate government
information had to be disclosed -- much
of it undoubtedly of use to bin Laden's
terrorist planners.
The precedent for Bush's secret tribunals
for persons who he has "reason to
believe" are involved in terrorism -- is an
obscure (until recently) 1942 Supreme
Court case, Ex Parte Quirin. In that case,
eight German soldiers were arrested in the
United States while on a covert campaign
of sabotage aimed at stores, bridges and
utilities. To keep them out of civilian
courts, Roosevelt ordered them charged
with violating the laws of war and had
them tried in secret by a panel of military
officers, which sentenced them to death,
subject to FDR's approval. The Supreme
Court consented, saying that
constitutional guarantees did not apply to
foreign combatants charged with war
crimes within the United States. In so
doing, the court carved out a new
distinction between military justice for
noncitizens and Lincoln-style military
tribunals for U.S. citizens, which have
been barred since an 1866 decision known
as Ex Parte Milligan.
As a case study in what happens to due
process when the president acts as
prosecutor and judge as well as
commander in chief, Quirin is not
reassuring. The trial was held in secret not
only to protect legitimate intelligence
sources and methods, but also to conceal
the embarrassing fact that J. Edgar
Hoover's FBI had failed to uncover the
plot until one of the Germans came to
Washington and offered a detailed
confession. (FDR commuted the
sentences of that saboteur and another;
they were later freed and sent back to
Germany after the war by President Harry
S. Truman). Supreme Court justices had
serious misgivings, but were swayed by
pressure from the administration and an
emotional private appeal from Justice
Felix Frankfurter, who argued that
anything but a unanimous verdict in favor
of the president would undermine U.S.
military morale.
Then again, the saboteurs were fighting
for Hitler. If they had been seen sneaking
around a U.S. base in Europe, they would
have been shot on the spot. Morally, if
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not legally, it's hard to understand why
they should have enjoyed extra protection
simply because they were sneaking around
within the United States. The last thing
Roosevelt wanted to do in democracy's
life-and-death struggle with Nazism was
to give the enemy a perverse incentive to
infiltrate the country and engage in
terrorism. The same can be said of bin
Laden and his clandestine army. The real
lesson of Quirin is that the big stick of a
military tribunal should be coupled with
the carrot of amnesty for those terrorists
(not including al Qaeda's top leaders) who
lay down their arms and cooperate with
U.S. intelligence.
Certainly, liberated people all over the
world are glad that Roosevelt waged all-
out war on Nazism and Japanese
imperialism, whatever terrible mistakes he
made on the home front. Among the
grateful are millions of African Americans
and women, whose rights expanded in the
postwar years, in part because they could
cite the anti-racist nature of the war
against Germany. Similarly, Lincoln may
have traduced habeas corpus, but the
Union eventually freed the slaves and
saved the world's greatest experiment in
self-government.
America's wars -- including World War I,
during which the government's violations
of civil liberty seemed least justifiable,
either then or now -- are part of a larger
narrative of national growth and
integration in which freedom and
individual rights have, over time,
ascended. This has by no means been a
smooth process. The Civil War gave way
to the Ku Klux Klan; World War I segued
into the Palmer Raids, a sweeping round-
up of suspected anarchists and
communists after a series of bombings;
and World War II gave way to the anti-
communist excesses of the 1950s. But
Americans today enjoy far greater legal
rights of all kinds, and our society is more
inclusive than it was in 1863.
Throughout history, civil libertarians have
played a vital role in defending the
wrongly accused and making the case for
the smallest feasible governmental
intrusions on constitutional liberty. They
are playing that honorable role now. Yet it
is precisely through such intense political
debate and struggle, and not only through
lawsuits, that enduring gains for individual
rights have been achieved. If Bush has not
gone even further in cracking down on
terrorism it is because he is constrained by
a legal and political culture far more
favorable toward civil liberties than
anything Lincoln, Wilson or FDR could
have imagined.
And don't underestimate the net increase
in freedom abroad that could yet result
from American victory now. (Witness the
dawn of liberty, however tentative, for
women in Kabul.) The United States
confronts not only a criminal menace to
its people and institutions, but also an
armed campaign to impose a quasi-
totalitarian political ideology,
masquerading as religion, on a vast region
of the earth. Our government needs to
proceed with maximal respect for
fundamental human rights as it goes about
winning this war. One of the terrorists'
goals is to provoke an authoritarian
overreaction by the United States and
other democracies. But it's way too early
to worry that they've succeeded.
Copyright @ 2001 The Washington Post
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Ideas & Trends: Executive Decisions; A Penchant for Secrecy
The New York Times
May 5, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
A FEDERAL judge's decision last week
that the Justice Department's detention of
a Jordanian student was a misuse of the
material witness statute served as a
reminder that nearly eight months after
Sept. 11, the balance between individual
liberty and national security remains
highly unstable.
It was never in doubt that the terrorist
attacks would alter the balance between
these two values. American history is filled
with examples of how domestic and
foreign threats, perceived or -- as today --
real, provoked shifts in power away from
the rights of the individual and toward the
promise of safety and order.
Even against that background, the Bush
administration's pursuit of the domestic
war on terrorism into uncharted and
ambiguous legal territory is striking. Many
of its choices reveal the same instinct for
secrecy and penchant for unilateral
executive- branch action that the
administration has displayed on political
fields of battle unrelated to terrorism.
In fact, long after judges have ruled on
challenges to the prolonged detentions,
closed immigration hearings and other
policies that Attorney General John
Ashcroft is defending in courts around the
country, the legacy of this chapter of the
perennial effort to calibrate the balance
between liberty and security may lie in
whatever verdict the political as well as the
legal system renders on the value of
transparency in government.
Secrecy is at the heart of an escalating
battle over the identities of hundreds of
detainees, mostly Muslim men from Arab
and Asian countries, being held for the
federal government in New Jersey county
jails. Responding to a suit by the
American Civil Liberties Union, a state
court applied New Jersey's right-to-know
law and ordered the names made public.
The secret detentions were "odious to a
democratic society," ruled Judge Arthur
N. D'Italia of Superior Court.
The Justice Department not only
appealed, but last month issued a
regulation that bars state and local
governments from making the names
public. The order, which did not involve
Congress, injected complex questions of
federal pre-emption and separation of
powers into the mix. Ronald K. Chen,
associate dean of Rutgers School of Law-
Newark, who is handling the case for the
A.C.L.U., said that by issuing the new
regulation, the administration was "using
the continued latitude the public is willing
to give in order to push back the frontiers
of what the government can keep secret."
The sense that the administration is using
the war on terrorism to accomplish long-
held policy goals is not limited to liberals.
"They are taking language off the shelf
that's been ready to go into any vehicle,"
said Roger Pilon, vice president for legal
affairs at the Cato Institute, the libertarian
research group. He was particularly critical
of a provision the administration inserted
into the U.S.A. Patriot Act that enhanced
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the government's ability to seize assets
through forfeiture.
The Cato Institute has been critical of
forfeiture for years, but Mr. Pilon had a
broader criticism: "Government grows
each time there's a crisis," he said, "and
this is an executive branch that thinks it's
a law unto itself. Your guard has to be
up.
ONE surprising development was the
recent indictment of a criminal defense
lawyer, Lynne F. Stewart, charged with
providing material aid for her client, an
Egyptian sheik, now serving a life
sentence for an earlier plot to destroy the
World Trade Center and other New York
landmarks. Whatever the merits of the
unusual charges, the Justice Department's
decision to turn its prosecutorial attention
to the defense bar fit with a view widely
held in some Republican circles that
lawyers are the problem, whether
defending tort plaintiffs, poor people or
terrorists.
In 1996, for example, Congress barred
Legal Services Corporation lawyers from
making specific arguments on behalf of
welfare recipients, restrictions the
Supreme Court overturned last year as
violating the First Amendment. In going
after the pugnacious Ms. Stewart, who has
also represented Weather Underground
radicals, Mafia defendants and other
unpopular clients, the department picked
a target unlikely to evoke widespread
sympathy. She denies the charges.
The indictment left many lawyers troubled
but uncertain how to respond in the
absence of much explanation. "I really
hope theyve got some evidence,"
Professor Chen said. "Otherwise it's a
very dangerous precedent for the
adversarial process."
More troubling to some is a Justice
Department policy issued last fall that
authorizes monitoring of conversations
between defense lawyers and their
imprisoned but not necessarily convicted
clients. The fact that lawyers will be
notified, and privileged information about
defense strategy will supposedly not be
forwarded to prosecutors, has not allayed
concerns of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, among others. Its
committee on professional responsibility
issued a critical statement last month,
saying, "even in the war on terrorism, the
basic principles on which our system of
justice is balanced ought not to be
tampered with."
Robert J. Anello, the chairman of the bar
association committee, said the major flaw
was that the attorney general, rather than a
magistrate or judge, will select the lawyers
to be monitored. A garden-variety search
warrant requires judicial approval, Mr.
Anello said. "Getting a search warrant is
not terribly difficult," he said, adding that
if the attorney general has enough
information to decide to eavesdrop on a
specific lawyer, "that should be enough to
convince a magistrate."
ANY attorney general needs the layer of
neutrality a judge provides, Mr. Anello
said. "You need to check someone's
predisposition," he said. "Ashcroft's is to
root out crime at all costs, but like all well-
intentioned people, he needs to be
checked."
Ronald D. Rotunda, a law professor at the
University of Illinois and a former
consultant to Kenneth W. Starr's
independent counsel investigation, said
that while it was "fair to raise questions,"
the administration's critics were too quick
to assume the worst. "What amazes me is
how careful the government has been," he
said, adding that there were plausible legal
arguments for the monitoring program.
However, Professor Rotunda said the
administration had hurt itself by not
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making its case publicly. "I've heard better
arguments than they're giving," he said. "I
hope they give better explanations in the
future."
When criticism has been impossible to
ignore, as happened with the executive
order creating military tribunals to try
suspected terrorists, the administration's
response has been to tack slightly and
recharacterize the criticism's target as a
work in progress rather than a final
product. The Pentagon turned down
requests from legal groups to circulate the
regulations for public comment before
issuing them in late March, four months
after the bare-bones executive order had
raised many questions about how the
tribunals would work
The regulations addressed some of the
questions but left many critics unsatisfied.
Any military tribunal established by
executive order rather than by legislation
is "flatly unconstitutional," Prof. Neal K.
Katyal of the Georgetown Law Center
and Prof. Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard
Law School argue in an article in the
current Yale Law Journal. Their target is
not tribunals as such but rather the
"exceptional unilateralism" that the
president's order exemplified.
"Our position is that the Constitution sets
up a structure whereby the concurrence of
all three branches is normally needed in
order to authorize a decisive departure
from the legal status quo," the two
professors write, adding: "Under the
order, the executive branch acts as
lawmaker, law-enforcer and judge." It is
the kind of "accumulation of all powers,"
they say, that James Madison described in
the Federalist Papers as "the very
definition of tyranny."
Others reject such dire views. "We've
been reasonably true to our values and
constitutional structure," said Douglas W.
Kmiec, an assistant attorney general in the
Reagan administration who is now law
school dean at the Catholic University of
America. "We have never confronted a
problem of this magnitude, and we're
trying to adjust laws and procedures in a
responsible way, a responsibly aggressive
way. An equally robust defense bar will
push the envelope back in the opposite
direction. That usually brings us to the
right place."
Whether such optimism is warranted --
and past experience suggests it may not
always be -- will not be evident until the
wavering balance between liberty and
security, sunlight and shadow, finds its
new equilibriun. For now, it is enough to
suggest that history will judge this
challenging period in part by where the
balance finally comes to rest.
Copyright * 2002 The New York Times
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Historically, Laws Bend in Time of War, Rehnquist Says; Courts: Chief Justice
Contends Judges Are Inclined to Back the Government in Crises.
Lincoln's Suspension of Habeas Corpus Is Cited.
Los Angeles Times
June 15, 2002
David G. Savage
Chief Justice William H Rehnquist,
reviewing the history of civil liberties
during wartime, said Friday that the courts
are inclined to bend the law in the
government's favor during a time of
hostilities.
"One is reminded of the Latin maxim,
inter arma silent leges. In time of war, the
laws are silent," Rehnquist said in a speech
to federal judges meeting in Williamsburg,
Va.
He cited as examples President Lincoln's
suspension of the right to habeas corpus
during the Civil War and the Supreme
Court's willingness to uphold the
internment of Japanese Americans and the
secret military trial of eight Nazi saboteurs
during World War II.
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court
unanimously overruled the Union's use of
a military trial to condemn several
Confederate sympathizers in Indiana. And
Congress later apologized for the Japanese
internment, but long after the war was
over.
"These cases suggest that, while the laws
are surely not silent in time of war, courts
may interpret them differently then than
in time of peace," Rehnquist said.
He stressed he was offering "only a
historical perspective," not a prediction on
how the high court will handle civil
liberties complaints that arise from the
Bush administration's war on terrorism,
which has not formally been declared.
Nonetheless, the chief justice has made it
clear he believes it is unrealistic to expect
judges to boldly challenge the
government's action at a time when a
threat to the nation's security is real.
This is not a new topic for Rehnquist. A
history buff, he wrote a 1998 book on
civil liberties in wartime, titled "All the
Laws but One."
He recounted the infringements on civil
liberties during the Civil War and the two
world wars, and concluded that the
nation's respect for civil liberties has
grown steadily. Still, it is true that the
demands of war have outweighed the
commitment to civil liberties, at least
while the conflict is underway, he wrote.
On Friday, Rehnquist cited Hawaii's
imposition of martial law after the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Even though the bars
and restaurants reopened shortly
afterward, the civilian courts remained
closed by military order through most of
the war, he said.
Lloyd Duncan, a civilian shipyard worker,
was arrested and tried before a military
court after getting into a fight with two
guards at the Pearl Harbor base. Harry
White, a stockbroker, was also convicted
in a military court for embezzling funds
from a client.
Both men filed writs of habeas corpus
challenging their convictions. The
Supreme Court took up their appeals, and
in the case of Duncan vs. Kahanamoku,
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ruled that Hawaii's military trials for
civilians were unconstitutional.
"The good news for the defendants, and
perhaps for the people of Hawaii, was that
martial law was illegal there at the time
these defendants were tried in 1943,"
Rehnquist said. "The bad news was that
they did not find out about it until
February 1946, a half year after the end of
the war with Japan."
A lawyer for Jose Padilla, the accused
"dirty" bomb plotter, is expected to file a
writ of habeas corpus challenging his
detention in a military brig in Charleston,
S.C.
The writ claims that Padilla, a U.S. citizen,
is being held unconstitutionally, and it
asks a federal judge to grant the writ and
release the detainee.
Such a writ can be acted upon
immediately by a judge. If the writ is
rejected, lawyers for Padilla could send an
appeal up through the court system.
Similarly, if the writ is granted, Bush
administration lawyers would appeal
immediately.
Copyright © 2002 Los Angeles Times
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National Security State
(Antiterrorism Act of 2001, Civil Liberties, and Government Investigations of
Terrorism)
The Nation
December 17, 2001
David Cole
It is already a cliche that the attacks of
September 11 "changed everything." One
thing they do seem to have changed is
liberals. Harvard law professor Laurence
Tribe, a stalwart defender of civil rights
and civil liberties, has condoned the use of
military tribunals and the detention of
more than 1,200 people, even though not
a single detainee has been charged in
connection with the attacks. His colleague
Alan Dershowitz has suggested that
torture may sometimes be justified, as
long as it is authorized by a warrant. And
George Washington law professor Jeff
Rosen has argued that "the real story after
September 11 is that America hasn't yet
come close to abandoning any immutable
principles of its national identity."
I cite these scholars not to single them out
for criticism--all are important and
courageous liberal voices--but as
illustrations of a larger trend. Even liberals
these days seem reluctant to criticize the
government's response to the new threat
of terronsm.
But a brief overview of what we've done
so far in the interest of "homeland
security" makes clear that we have already
abandoned several of our "immutable
principles" and have already begun to
repeat the mistakes of the past.
Consider first the USA Patriot Act, an
omnibus law of 342 pages enacted under
in terrorem threats from Attorney General
John Ashcroft, who suggested that if
another terrorist incident occurred before
Congress passed it, the blame would rest
on Congress. The nuts and bolts of the
law were worked out in a couple of all-
night sessions and approved by large
majorities the day they were introduced,
even though members could not possibly
have read the bill before casting their
votes.
The Patriot Act imposes guilt by
association on mnigrants, rendering
them deportable for wholly innocent
nonviolent associational activity on behalf
of any organization blacklisted as terrorist
by the Secretary of State. Any group of
two or more that has used or threatened
to use force can be designated as terrorist.
This provision in effect resurrects the
philosophy of McCarthyism, simply
substituting "terrorist" for "communist."
Perhaps not realizing the pun, the
Supreme Court has condemned guilt by
association as "alien to the traditions of a
free society and the First Amendment
itself." Yet it is now the rule for aliens in
our free society.
The Patriot Act also authorizes the
Attorney General to lock up aliens,
potentially indefinitely, on mere suspicion,
without any hearing and without any
obligation to establish to a court that the
detention is necessary to forestall flight or
danger to the community. Moreover, most
of the more than 1,200 detentions already
effected have not relied upon this
authority-, the detainees are instead held
on pretextual criminal charges, as material
witnesses and under pre-Patriot Act
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immigration authority. The government
claims that about ten to fifteen of the
detained may be linked to Al Qaeda, but
what about the other 1,185? We can't
know the answer to that question, because
the Justice Department refuses to disclose
even the most basic information about
most of the detainees, such as who they
are, what they are being held for or where
they're imprisoned. On November 27
Ashcroft reluctantly identified about fifty
people in custody on federal criminal
charges but refused to identify more than
500 held on immigration charges, or even
to put a number on those held as material
witnesses or on state charges. Never in
our history has the government engaged
in such a blanket practice of secret
incarceration.
Secrecy has become the order of the day.
Criminal proceedings are governed by gag
orders--themselves secret--preventing
defendants or their lawyers from saying
anything to the public about their
predicament. The INS has conducted
secret immigration proceedings, closed to
the public and even to family members.
The Patriot Act authorizes never-
disclosed wiretaps and secret searches in
criminal investigations without probable
cause of a crime, the bedrock
constitutional predicate for any search.
And in a federal court of appeals in Miami
in November, the government renewed its
defense of the use of secret evidence in
immigration proceedings, arguing that it
needs the authority more than ever after
September 11 to detain aliens by using
evidence they cannot confront or rebut.
We can look forward to more secrecy still.
A major impetus behind George W.
Bush's presidential order authorizing the
trial of suspected terrorists in military
tribunals was the desire to avoid the
constitutional necessity of disclosing
classified evidence to the defendant in an
ordinary criminal trial. In military
tribunals, defendants have no right to a
public trial, no right to trial by jury, no
right to confront the evidence or to object
to illegally obtained evidence and no right
to appeal to an independent court. The
military acts as prosecutor, judge, jury and
executioner, and a death sentence can be
imposed by a two-thirds vote of the
military officers presiding.
We have used military tribunals to try our
enemies in times of war before. There has
been no declared war here, but perhaps
that can be excused as a technicality. What
cannot be excused is the extension of the
tribunals to US residents who have no
connection to Al Qaeda whatsoever but
who are merely charged with
"international terrorism," a wholly
undefined offense, or of harboring
someone so charged. Military tribunals
have always been limited to the trial of
belligerents--those fighting for the enemy,
as the Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte
Milhigan during the Civil War. Bush's
order, however, allows the President to
dispense with a criminal trial for any
noncitizen accused of terrorism.
In one setting - attorney-client-
communications -- secrecy will no longer
be the rule. At the end of October,
Ashcroft asserted the authority to listen in
on such highly privileged discussions
without a warrant.
Finally, we have succumbed to ethnic
profiling. The Justice Department has
instructed law enforcement agents across
the country to "interview" more than
5,000 immigrants based not on any
evidence that they are connected to Al
Qaeda or the events of September 11 but
solely on their age, gender and country of
origin. The list looks suspiciously like
what an enterprising lawyer would come
up with if instructed to make a list of
immigrant Arab men but to make it look
like it wasn't based on ethnicity.
89
After facing some initial, albeit muted,
opposition to its first antiterrorism
legislative proposal to Congress, the
Administration has chosen since then to
bypass Congress altogether. It has also
bypassed the public, instead instituting
radical changes through rule-makings that
go into effect the moment they are
published and without notice or
comment.
The Administration has made no case that
its pre-existmig authorities were
insufficient. We have successfully tried
senous terronst crimes in open court with
all the protections that customarily apply,
without regard to whether the defendants
were citizens or aliens. Before the Patriot
Act, we could deport aliens who
supported terrorist activity in any way and
could detain aliens who posed a threat to
national security or posed a risk of flight.
And we had authority to conduct wiretaps
and searches in foreign intelligence
investigations without probable cause of a
crime, as long as that authority was not
used as an end-run around the
constitutional rules that govern criminal
investigations. The government has not
even tried to show that the absence of any
of its newfound powers contributed to its
failure to identify and thwart the
September 11 attacks.
Rather, what the Administration has said,
time and time again, is that we are "at
war." Apparently this statement renders
any further argument unnecessary. Thus,
Ashcroft tells us that because we are at
war, "foreign terrorists who commit war
crimes against the United States...are not
entitled to and do not deserve the
protections of the American
Constitution." But putting aside whether
we are "at war" without a declaration of
war, the bigger problem is that we can't
know whether someone is a "foreign
terrorist" until those charges are proven in
a fair proceeding. The military tribunals
eliminate virtually every procedural check
designed to protect the innocent and
accurately identify the guilty.
These initiatives have sparked opposition
from unlikely quarters. Police officers in
Portland, Oregon, have refused to take
part in the interviews of the 5,000
immigrant men, citing local laws against
racial profiling. Spain has said it will not
extradite eight men charged with
complicity in the September 11 attacks
unless we promise not to try them in
military tribunals. Even William Safire has
called the military tribunals "kangaroo
courts." And on Capitol Hill, Republican
Orrin Hatch has joined Democrat Patrick
Leahy in calling on Ashcroft to answer
questions before the Judiciary Committee
about his recent executive initiatives.
So why are so many liberals satisfied with
the government's response? Why hasn't
there been a louder outcry about the
measures adopted? Why hasn't the
Administration been asked to justify its
newfound authorities on a power-by-
power basis? For one thing, we are afraid,
and in times of fear we crave security
above all. For another, in the face of an
attack we naturally and properly seek to
stick together, to show a united front. But
in times of fear and crisis we also panic.
And panic causes us to abandon our
pnnciples.
So have we abandoned any "immutable
principles," as Jeff Rosen calls then Well,
political freedom has given way to guilt by
association. Due process has given way to
detention on the Attorney General's say-
so. Public scrutiny has given way to secret
detentions and secret trials. Equal
protection under law has given way to
ethnic profiling. And we're only three
months into this. We can't afford to let
liberal vigilance give way to complacency.
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Security Versus Civil Liberties
The Atlantic Monthly
December 2001
Richard A. Posner
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks have come many proposals for
tightening security, some measures to that
end have already been taken. Civil
libertarians are troubled. They fear that
concerns about national security will lead
to an erosion of civil liberties. They offer
historical examples of supposed
overreactions to threats to national
security. They treat our existing civil
liberties-freedom of the press, protections
of privacy and of the rights of criminal
suspects, and the rest-as sacrosanct,
insisting that the battle against
international terrorism accommodate itself
to them.
I consider this a profoundly mistaken
approach to the question of balancing
liberty and security. The basic mistake is
the prioritizing of liberty. It is a mistake
about law and a mistake about history. Let
me begin with law. What we take to be
our civil liberties-for example, immunity
from arrest except upon probable cause to
believe we've committed a crime, and
from prosecution for violating a criminal
statute enacted after we committed the act
that violates it-were made legal rights by
the Constitution and other enactments.
The other enactments can be changed
relatively easily, by amendatory legislation.
Amending the Constitution is much more
difficult. In recognition of this the
Framers left most of the constitutional
provisions that confer rights pretty vague.
The courts have made them definite.
Concretely, the scope of these rights has
been determined, through an interaction
of constitutional text and subsequent
judicial interpretation, by a weighing of
competing interests. I'll call them the
public-safety interest and the liberty
interest. Neither, in my view, has priority.
They are both important, and their relative
importance changes from time to time
and from situation to situation. The safer
the nation feels, the more weight judges
will be willing to give to the liberty
interest. The greater the threat that an
activity poses to the nation's safety, the
stronger will the grounds seem for seeking
to repress that activity even at some cost
to liberty. This fluid approach is only
common sense. Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson gave it vivid expression
many years ago when he said, in
dissenting from a free-speech decision he
thought doctrinaire, that the Bill of Rights
should not be made into a suicide pact. It
was not intended to be such, and the
present contours of the rights that it
confers, having been shaped far more by
judicial interpretation than by the literal
text (which doesn't define such critical
terms as "due process of law" and
"unreasonable" arrests and searches), are
alterable in response to changing threats
to national security.
If it is true, therefore, as it appears to be at
this writing, that the events of September
11 have revealed the United States to be
in much greater jeopardy from
international terrorism than had
previously been believed-have revealed it
to be threatened by a diffuse, shadowy
enemy that must be fought with police
measures as well as military force-it stands
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to reason that our civil liberties will be
curtailed. They should be curtailed, to the
extent that the benefits in greater security
outweigh the costs in reduced liberty. All
that can reasonably be asked of the
responsible legislative and judicial officials
is that they weigh the costs as carefully as
the benefits.
It will be argued that the lesson of history
is that officials habitually exaggerate
dangers to the nation's security. But the
lesson of history is the opposite. It is
because officials have repeatedly and
disastrously underestimated these dangers
that our history is as violent as it is.
Consider such underestimated dangers as
that of secession, which led to the Civil
War; of a Japanese attack on the United
States, which led to the disaster at Pearl
Harbor, of Soviet espionage in the 1940s,
which accelerated the Soviet Union's
acquisition of nuclear weapons and
emboldened Stalin to encourage North
Korea's invasion of South Korea; of the
installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba,
which precipitated the Cuban missile
crisis; of political assassinations and
outbreaks of urban violence in the 1960s;
of the Tet Offensive of 1968; of the
Iranian revolution of 1979 and the
subsequent taking of American diplomats
as hostages; and, for that matter, of the
events of September 11.
It is true that when we are surprised and
hurt, we tend to overreact-but only with
the benefit of hindsight can a reaction be
separated into its proper and excess layers.
In hindsight we know that interning
Japanese-Americans did not shorten
World War II. But was this known at the
time? If not, shouldn't the Army have
erred on the side of caution, as it did?
Even today we cannot say with any
assurance that Abraham Lincoln was
wrong to suspend habeas corpus during
the Civil War, as he did on several
occasions, even though the Constitution is
clear that only Congress can suspend this
right. (Another of Lincoln's wartime
measures, the Emancipation
Proclamation, may also have been
unconstitutional.) But Lincoln would have
been wrong to cancel the 1864
presidential election, as some urged: by
November of 1864 the North was close to
victory, and canceling the election would
have created a more dangerous precedent
than the wartime suspension of habeas
corpus. This last example shows that civil
liberties remain part of the balance even in
the most dangerous of times, and even
though their relative weight must then be
less.
Lincoln's unconstitutional acts during the
Civil War show that even legality must
sometimes be sacrificed for other values.
We are a nation under law, but first we are
a nation. I want to emphasize something
else, however: the malleability of law, its
pragmatic rather than dogmatic character.
The law is not absolute, and the slogan
"Fiat iustitia rat caelum" ("Let justice be
done though the heavens fall") is
dangerous nonsense. The law is a human
creation rather than a divine gift, a tool of
government rather than a mandarin
mystery. It is an instrument for promoting
social welfare, and as the conditions
essential to that welfare change, so must it
change.
Civil libertarians today are missing
something else-the opportunity to
challenge other public-safety concerns
that impair civil liberties. I have
particularly in mind the war on drugs. The
sale of illegal drugs is a "victimless" crime
in the special but important sense that it is
a consensual activity. Usually there is no
complaining witness, so in order to bring
the criminals to justice the police have to
rely heavily on paid informants (often
highly paid and often highly unsavory,
undercover agents, wiretaps and other
forms of electronic surveillance, elaborate
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sting operations, the infiltration of suspect
organizations, random searches, the
monitoring of airports and highways, the
"profiling" of likely suspects on the basis
of ethnic or racial identity or national
origin, compulsory drug tests, and other
intrusive methods that put pressure on
civil liberties. The war on drugs has been a
big flop; moreover, in light of what
September 11 has taught us about the
gravity of the terrorist threat to the United
States, it becomes hard to take entirely
seriously the threat to the nation that drug
use is said to pose. Perhaps it is time to
redirect law-enforcement resources from
the investigation and apprehension of
drug dealers to the investigation and
apprehension of international terrorists.
By doing so we may be able to minimize
the net decrease in our civil liberties that
the events of September 11 have made
inevitable.
[Richard A. Posner is a judge on the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.]
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War on Terror Makes for Odd Twists in Justice System
The New York Times
June 23, 2002
Katharine Q. Seelye
In one of the strange turns in the war on
terrorism, two Americans are being held
in military brigs without access to lawyers,
while two foreigners accused of terrorist
activities are being tried in federal court
with the full range of protections usually
accorded to Americans.
This patchwork approach has revealed a
flexibility in the justice system but also
what critics call an overly broad assertion
of presidential authority.
The government contends it can detain
people until the hostilities are over --
whenever that is -- without charging them
or giving them access to lawyers. The
dispute is likely to end up before the
Supreme Court.
The Americans in prison are Yasser Esam
Hamdi, born in Louisiana and raised in
Saudi Arabia, and Jose Padilla, born in
Brooklyn and raised in Chicago. A third
American, John Walker Lindh, born in the
District of Columbia and raised in
California, is facing a trial.
Mr. Lindh has a high-powered legal team
defending him in federal court in
Alexandria, Va., against 10 counts,
including conspiring to kill Americans and
supporting terronst organizations.
Mr. Hamdi, picked up on the battlefield in
Afghanistan in November, was sent to
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba then moved to
a brig in Norfolk, Va., on April 22 when
the authorities confirmed he had been
born in America. He has not been
charged.
The government moved Mr. Hamdi from
Cuba to the mainland because he was
American, meaning that he had more
rights than other Guantanamo detainees.
But now it argues that his citizenship is
irrelevant, that he is an enemy combatant
and does not deserve the legal protections
most Americans enjoy. The government is
also blocking him from speaking with his
court-appointed lawyer.
Government officials said Mr. Hamdi has
not been charged because he is being held
for the protection of the country, not for
prosecution.
Mr. Padilla was arrested on May 8 and has
been in a brig near Charleston, S.C., since
June 10. He was taken into custody in
connection with what officials said was a
plot to build and detonate a "dirty bomb."
Mr. Padilla has also not been charged and
has not had access to a lawyer.
The two foreigners jailed on terronsm
charges are Zacarias Moussaoui, a French
citizen, and Richard C. Reid, a Briton. Mr.
Moussaoui, accused as the "20th hijacker,"
has had hearings in federal court in
Alexandria, Va., where he is representing
himself. Mr. Reid's case is pending in
federal court in Boston.
Some legal experts say the variety of
approaches underscores the judicial
system's elasticity. "There is a learning
process," said Eugene R. Fidell, president
of the National Institute of Military
Justice. "The fact is, there seems to be an
unusual range of options available."
95
David Cole, a Georgetown University law
professor, said that the evidence, or lack
of it, might explain the inconsistencies in
treatment. "Where they feel they can win a
criminal case, they'll go the criminal
route," Professor Cole said. "Where they
feel they can't, where they don't have the
evidence," officials put the prisoner in a
military brig, he said.
He also suggested that the Lindh case was
demonstrating to the government that
public trials for some of these suspects
can be tricky. For example, the
government has suggested that Mr.
Hamdi, as well as some prisoners in
Guantanamo, may have information that
clears Mr. Lindh. The judge in Mr. Lindh's
case, T. S. Ellis 1II, has told the defense
lawyers that they can talk to Mr. Hamdi if
Mr. Harmdi's lawyer agrees, but the
government is not agreeing that Mr.
Hamdi even has a lawyer.
Judge Ellis said denying Mr. Lindh access
to a witness who could clear him would
violate his rights. He also told government
prosecutors that at some point, they
would have to decide whether to go ahead
and prosecute Mr. Lindh, which would
mean giving him access to Mr. Hamdi, or
whether the need to keep Mr. Hamdi
isolated was so overwhelming that they
would drop their case against Mr. Lindh.
Others say the multiple approaches have
exposed an overreaching of presidential
authority. Michael Posner, executive
director of the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, said that the government's
stance in the Hamdi case showed "that
Americans now have less protection
under the law than several of the
noncitizens accused of taking action
against the U.S."
Administration officials said their
treatment of the Americans in captivity
was proper. "We've been very careful
about each one of these guys under the
circumstances and feel very comfortable
about the legality of what we're doing,"
one senior official said.
He emphasized that the purpose of
detaining Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla was
not to prosecute them but to keep them
from rejoining any anti-American forces.
"This is not a punitive action, it's self-
protection," he said.
In papers filed on Wednesday in the
Hamdi case in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Richmond, Va., the government argued
that anyone detained in connection with
the war on terrorism was an enemy
combatant and had no right to a lawyer.
Mr. Hamdi's lawyer, Frank W. Dunham
Jr., argued that the government presented
no evidence that Mr. Hamdi was an
enemy combatant.
The executive branch, Mr. Dunham said,
"does not have the authority to detain an
American citizen incommunicado and to
unilaterally withdraw from the courts the
power to inquire into the propriety of his
detention."
The government's arguments in the
Hamdi case startled legal experts and
stirred critics who had quieted down after
a confrontation about military tribunals.
"The route they have created in this ad
hoc way is devoid of any constraint on the
president's power," Mr. Cole said. "The
notion that he can pick people up off the
street, label them and lock them up for
the rest of their lives without a hearing is a
remarkable one."
It also prompted some, like Douglas W.
Kmiec, dean of the law school at Catholic
University and a professor of
constitutional law, to suggest that perhaps
President Bush should amend the Nov. 13
order that set up the military tribunals.
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President Bush issued the order before
the government knew it would find
Americans suspected of involvement with
foreign terrorists; the order specifically
exempted Americans from a tribunal's
jurisdiction.
That exemption was a concession to make
the tribunals politically palatable to critics
in Congress.
But Mr. Kmiec said that including
Americans in the tribunal system would
give the prisoners a legal forum and would
deflect criticism that the United States was
undermining a basic tenet of its judicial
system.
"Everyone is legitimately concerned when
a U.S. citizen can be detained without
charge and without access to counsel,"
Mr. Kmiec said. "It perplexes federal
judges."
Mr. Kmiec, who led the office of legal
counsel in the Reagan administration and
the first Bush administration, said he had
broached the idea with current
administration officials.
"They know there is an anomaly in the
process about how different people are
being treated, and they are worried there
will be more," he said.
Senior administration officials, however,
said no amendment of the order was
being considered.
No tribunals have been held, and do not
seem imminent, in part, officials said,
because the government is trying to get
information from the prisoners, not
punish then
"We're not in the criminal justice business,
we're in the national defense business,"
said a top administration official. "First
things first."
Mr. Dunham, Mr. Hamdi's lawyer,
remains concerned about what he calls the
"uneven" treatment. He said that Mr.
Lindh seemed to be better off than his
client because at least Mr. Lindh was
accused of something and could defend
himself.
"Our client hasn't been charged with any
crime, and the government says that since
they haven't charged him with a crime,
they can hold him forever," he said. "It
seems to be a little strange. A guy is worse
off if he's not charged with a crime."
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
Company.
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Traces of Tenor The Detainees;
Lawyers Argue Over Rights of a Citizen Seized on Enemy Land
The New York Times
June 26, 2002
Katharine Q. Seelye
An appellate judge hearing one of the
most closely watched cases pitting civil
liberties against national security seemed
favorable today toward the government
argument that an American citizen can be
held indefinitely without being charged
with anything or represented by a lawyer.
The case involves Yaser Esam Hamdi, 21,
who was born in Louisiana, reared in
Saudi Arabia and captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. Mr. Hamdi was
sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until
officials discovered he had been born in
the United States, and then moved him to
the naval brig in Norfolk, Va. He has been
held there since April 5, not charged with
any crime or allowed to see a lawyer,
although a district court has appointed a
public defender to represent him.
In oral arguments here before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, the chief
judge, appeared incredulous today at Mr.
Hamdi's lawyer's assertion that his client --
captured during battle and designated an
enemy combatant -- had any
constitutional rights.
"What is unconstitutional about the
government detaining that person and
getting from that individual all the
intelligence that might later save American
lives?" Judge Wilkinson asked Geremy
Kamens, an assistant federal public
defender helping to represent Mr. Hamdi.
Mr. Kamens said the Constitution
prohibited the indefinite detention of an
American citizen, and Judge Wilkinson
was quick to interrupt.
Was he suggesting that the government
could not detain a citizen "who has taken
up arms against America?" Judge
Wilkinson asked in a voice that suggested
he could not believe his ears.
Mr. Kamens argued that there was no
evidence that Mr. Hamdi was actually an
enemy combatant, but the judge came
back at him.
Suppose an inquiry established that Mr.
Hamdi was an enemy combatant and
fought on the side of the Taliban and Al
Qaeda against American forces, Judge
Wilkinson said. "What is unconstitutional
about the detention of that individual and
trying to get intelligence from that
individual over a period of time, during
the course of hostilities, that would save
American lives?"
The judge added that he knew of no
previous cases that said it was wrong to
interrogate an enemy combatant who had
been captured on the battlefield.
"This has been done in every war that I
know of," he said.
The sharp exchange seemed a preview of
an argument likely to reach the Supreme
Court in an escalating battle between the
rights of American citizens and the power
of the president to detain and interrogate
enemy combatants while hostilities are
continuing.
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Judge Wilkinson and two colleagues were
hearing an appeal by the government of a
lower court ruling that ordered the Navy
to give Mr. Hamdi unfettered access to
the public defender. The hearing was
conducted by teleconference, because the
judges were dispersed. It was piped
through speakers into the federal
courthouse here, where reporters listened
in.
The Fourth Circuit, one of the most
conservative appellate courts in the
country, could issue its opinion anytime.
The government argued in papers filed
last week that the lower court judge,
Robert G. Doumar of Federal District
Court, was trying to usurp the president's
authority in a time of war and had acted
improperly in providing Mr. Hamdi a
lawyer before allowing the government to
make its case.
The government's case was argued today
by Paul Clement, deputy solicitor general,
who said the courts should not second-
guess the president's decision to hold Mr.
Hamdi as an enemy combatant. The
judiciary "can answer legal questions," Mr.
Cement said, but further interference
would not be "terribly helpful."
Judge Wilkinson, who asked to see the
president's determination of Mr. Hamdi's
status, which has not been made public,
said the case posed serious separation-of-
powers issues. But he was far more
emphatic in his questioning of and
declarations to the public defender.
Today's vigorous argument "underscores
one of my basic problems with this case,"
Judge Wilkinson said. which is that it
poses a number of difficult questions and
the lower court appears not to have given
them proper attention.
"How in the world could the district court
have proceeded to decide all these
questions and potentially pre-empt them
by appointing counsel without even giving
the government a chance to be heard?" he
asked. "That's what I don't understand."
Mr. Kamens said the district court's
appointment of a lawyer had nothing to
do with the legality of Mr. Hamdi's
detention, but Judge Wilkinson replied
that the appointment of counsel was
significant.
"If counsel is appointed," he said, "we are
deciding, for starters, that someone who
may well be an enemy combatant has a
right to counsel, No. 1. That's a major
issue.
"I don't know, for example, how counsel
can be separated from access or indeed
from the other rights in the criminal
justice system. I don't know how you can
appoint counsel without throwing into
jeopardy the government's intelligence-
gathering operation."
The government said, and Judge
Wilkinson agreed, that intelligence-
gathering could be disrupted because the
introduction of a third party could break
the atmosphere of trust that the
government was trying to establish with
the prisoner, particularly if the lawyer
urged the prisoner to assert his rights
against compelled self-incrimination.
Judge Wilkinson said the district judge's
appointment of counsel had already
"decided four or five mega issues without
even giving the other side the chance to
present its case."
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
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Holding Pattern; Why Congress Must Stop Ashcroft's Alien Detentions
The New Republic
December 10, 2001
Jeffrey Rosen
Of all the new security measures adopted
by the Bush administration since
September 11, the most draconian involve
the detention and interrogation of aliens.
In his dragnet effort to uncover evidence
of terrorism, Attorney General John
Ashcroft has authorized the detention of
some 1,100 noncitizens. Some have been
held for months and--thanks to recently
passed legislation--may be held
indefinitely. Critics call the Ashcroft
detentions unconstitutional. "We have
violated core constitutional principles,"
says David Cole of Georgetown
University Law Center, pointing to new
laws and regulations that allow the
government to detain aliens without bail;
deport or exclude them because of their
political associations; and eavesdrop on
their conversations with their attorneys.
Some of these measures may indeed
violate principles of procedural fairness,
free speech, and privacy. But they don't
violate the Constitution. Over the last 50
years the Supreme Court has imposed few
constitutional restraints on the ability of
Congress and the president to detain,
exclude, and deport aliens in ways that
would be grossly unconstitutional if
applied to citizens. As a result, Ashcroft
has virtually unlimited legal discretion in
his treatment of aliens. But that doesn't
mean he shouldn't be stopped; only that
judges aren't the people to stop him.
Although it may be difficult in the current
environment, our elected representatives
in Congress are the only officials
authorized to determine the fate and
defend the interests of mistreated aliens.
It's a role Congress has been reluctant to
play in the past. But Congress may be the
only hope we've got.
The most sweeping of the laws and
regulations passed in the wake of
September 11 are those that authorize the
indefinite detention of aliens whom
Ashcroft designates as suspected
terrorists. Most significantly, on
November 14, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service adopted a
regulation allowing the detention of aliens
whom the government wants to deport
but no other country will admit. If the
attorney general, in consultation with the
State Department, believes that their cases
raise significant "national security or
terrorism concerns," the aliens can be
locked up indefinitely.
The regulation is an attempt to respond to
the Zadvydas case, decided by the
Supreme Court last June. Before then, the
Court had repeatedly held that Congress
has virtually unlimited power to deport,
exclude, or detain immigrants at the
border. In Zadvydas, however, Justice
Stephen Breyer, writing for the 5-4
majority, held that in the 1996
immigration reform act, Congress hadn't
intended to authorize the indefinite
detention of aliens who couldn't be
deported because their home countries
wouldn't allow them back. (In fact,
Congress probably had intended to
authorize the detentions; Breyer stretched
the language of the law to avoid a
constitutional conflict.) But even though
Breyer intervened on behalf of aliens'
rights, his opinion included an important
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loophole: It stressed that Congress and
the president might have more leeway to
detain aliens indefinitely in cases involving
"terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made
for forms of preventative detention and
for heightened deference to the judgments
of the political branches with respect to
matters of national security."
The new INS regulations exploit this
loophole for all it's worth. They allow
John Ashcroft and Colin Powell
unilaterally to detain any deportable alien
whose release would have "serious
adverse foreign policy consequences," in
the government's opinion. And although
the regulations give the government
tremendous discretion to define a foreign
policy crisis, it's hard to imagine that the
Supreme Court would raise constitutional
objections. This is particularly true in light
of the USA Patriot Act, passed in
October, in which Congress explicitly
authorized the attorney general to detain
"suspected terrorists" indefinitely in
special circumstances. This time, there's
no ambiguity about congressional intent.
Another element of the USA Patriot Act
allows the deportation not only of
convicted terrorists, but of any alien who
provides financial support to a "terrorist
organization," broadly defined as a group
of people who threaten to use weapons. "I
would guess that somebody who writes a
check to the organizations that raise
money for the IRA might be brought
within this," says Peter Schuck of Yale
Law School. "That's troubling, but it's
hard to see how it could be more precisely
defined." Schuck suggests that judges
might interpret the law to say that the IRA
contributor can't be convicted as a
terrorist unless he knows more about how
the IRA operates than it takes to write a
check. But once again, it's a mistake to
rely on the courts: In the past, the
Supreme Court has been extremely
deferential to Congress in cases involving
the deportation of unpopular aliens.
In the 1950s, for example, Congress
passed the McCarran-Walter Act, which
allowed the government to exclude and
deport aliens who advocated communism.
The Supreme Court upheld the attorney
general's right to deport aliens who were
members of the Communist Party,
suggesting that Congress has the right to
treat aliens in ways that would violate the
First Amendment if applied to citizens.
The Court held that an alien couldn't use
his lack of knowledge about the
Communist Partys goals as a defense. It
also held that aliens could be detained
without bail while the government
decided what to do with them. These cold
war precedents may doom any legal
challenges to a regulation issued by the
INS in October allowing the Justice
Department to lock up aliens while
appealing an immigration judge's decision
to release them on bail.
The Patriot Act also authorizes Congress
to exclude from the United States any
aliens who "endorse or espouse terrorist
activity" or who "persuade others to
support terrorist activity or a terronst
organization." In 1953 the Supreme Court
upheld similar exclusions. In a famous
case, a Romanian alien named Mezei, who
had lived in the United States for 25 years,
went home to visit his dying mother,
when he tried to return, he was detained
on Ellis Island for almost two years on
grounds that his admission would be
"prejudicial to the public interest." The
Supreme Court held that he wasn't even
entitled to judicial review of the decision
not to release him on bail. Harry Kalven,
the great First Amendment scholar at the
University of Chicago, summed up the
Court's attitude toward exclusion and
deportation of suspected Communists this
way "The rule was that there were
absolutely no limits on the power of
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Congress to exclude aliens. Neither
inhibitions against gross racial
discrimination, against interference with
freedom of speech and association,
against breaking up the family, nor
restraints dictated by notions of basic
procedural fairness could stay the hand of
the government."
All this would be easier to swallow if the
government had to prove that the aliens it
was indefinitely locking up really did
threaten national security. Unfortunately,
because deportation hearings are
considered civil--not criminal--
proceedings, immigrants have none of the
rights available in criminal trials: to
appointed counsel, to the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence, to have the
government prove their dangerousness
beyond reasonable doubt.
A detained alien does have the right to a
lawyer--if he can afford one. But in his
most appalling decision of all, Ashcroft
has undermined this right as well. On
October 30 the attorney general approved
a rule allowing federal agents to eavesdrop
on conversations between federal inmates
and their lawyers whenever "reasonable
suspicion exists to believe that an inmate
may use the communications with
attorneys ... to facilitate acts of terrorism."
Even though an inmate's conversation
with his lawyer can't be used against him
by a criminal prosecutor, the presence of
federal monitors will severely inhibit the
ability of detainees-- innocent as well as
guilty--to speak candidly with their lawyers
and receive necessary legal advice.
The Ashcroft rule isn't only an egregious
incursion on privacy--it will also bring
little in the way of increased security.
After all, lawyers already can't help their
clients commit new crimes, and they have
an ethical obligation to report threats of
terrorism or violence. Under the so-called
"crime/fraud exception" to the attorney-
client prvilege, if the government has
probable cause to believe that a client is
using a lawyer to advance an illegal
scheme, it can get a court order or even
set up a sting operation. Moreover, as
Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law School
suggests, there are less-intrusive ways of
ensuring that the most dangerous suspects
don't use their lawyers to further terrorist
schemes: Lawyer-client conversations
could be videotaped and reviewed by
impartial judges, for example, rather than
by partisan government lawyers.
But although the Ashcroft eavesdropping
scheme is unnecessary and indefensible, it
doesn't violate the right to counsel. The
Sixth Amendment protects the attorney-
client privilege only in a criminal
prosecution, while most of the aliens who
will have their conversations spied on by
John Ashcroft will never be charged with
a crime.
If the courts won't protect aliens from
John Ashcroft, who can? The answer, for
better or worse, is Congress. The Bush
administration has shown little restraint in
the domestic war against terrorism. And
like any risk-averse federal agency, the
INS is resorting to dragnets to protect
itself against the charges of negligence that
will inevitably follow if more aliens
commit terrorist acts. As Schuck suggests,
Congress should carefully oversee the
Justice Department's enforcement of the
new laws and regulations authorizing the
detention of aliens. The Constitution,
after all, gives Congress, rather than the
president, plenary authority over
immigration. One of the many
unfortunate features of Ashcroft's
decision to permit eavesdropping on
attorney-client conversations is that it was
announced without consulting Congress.
Vermont Senator Pat Leahy is sufficiently
exercised by Ashcroft's failure to consult
Congress on a range of issues, including
the establishment of military courts, that
102
he has scheduled oversight hearings. If
Congress remains jealous of its
prerogatives to determine the fate of
aliens, perhaps its oversight will restrain
an administration unwilling to restrain
itself.
Unfortunately, history does not offer
much cause for optinisn. "The
communist deportation cases supply
almost experiment evidence of how little
Congress itself is disciplined by the
traditions of political tolerance," wrote
Harry Kalven. "They suggest that
Congress, when freed from constitutional
restraints, will pursue the logic of security
relentlessly."
In an even more famous abdication,
Congress failed to object to the detention
of Japanese-Americans during World War
II. It took 43 years for Congress to
recognize its error. The Civil Liberties Act
of 1988 issued an apology and $20,000 to
each of the Japanese-American citizens
and resident aliens interned during World
War II. "We know we're going to regret
this," says Alex Aleinikoff, a former
general counsel of the INS under
President Clinton. "Probably now is the
time we should be saying to the detained
aliens, 'We know we're taking something
from you and we should pay you later."'
Better yet, of course, would be not to
detain them unreasonably in the first
place.
Copyright © 2001 New Republic, Inc.
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Ashcroft Is Right to Detain Suspects in Terror Probe
The Wall Stwetfoumal
December 17, 2001
Griffin Bell
The horrific videotape of Osama bin
Laden chuckling over the killing of
thousands of people shows his insane
hatred of America. In addition to hatred,
though, he has financial resources,
technical education, experience and an
international network of fellow
conspirators. One response by the Justice
Department to the serious threat we face
from bin Laden and other terrorists has
been to jail several hundred people either
on suspicion that they are terrorists or as
material witnesses to terrorist crimes. I
think the Justice Department's campaign
is consistent with the Constitution and the
laws, and for the Justice Department to
have done less would have been
irresponsible.
The most fundamental safeguard against
arbitrary imprisonment is habeas corpus.
This old Latin term means that a court
may order the government to produce any
prisoner in court and justify its detention
of that person. The Constitution prohibits
the suspension of habeas corpus "unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."
President Lincoln, without congressional
approval, suspended habeas corpus
nationwide several times, and he often
suspended it locally. Any person held in
jail -- citizen or not -- is entitled to
petition the courts for habeas corpus.
During World War II the Supreme Court
heard the appeals of both German
saboteurs and Japanese General
Yamashita through habeas corpus
petitions.
In one sense, the arrests and detentions
carried out in the wake of September 11
have not been "preventive" at all. The
Justice Department has valid independent
reasons for detaining all of these
individuals, who fall into three categories:
those in violation of their immigration
status, those wanted for crimes, and those
whose testimony is deemed material to the
terrorism investigation. The Constitution
and federal law gave the Justice
Department the authority to arrest or
detain these groups of individuals long
before September 11.
The Justice Department, for example,
may, pending removal proceedings, hold
aliens who have violated the terms of their
entry into the United States. Obviously, it
may arrest individuals suspected of
committmig crimes. And it is permitted --
if a federal court approves -- to detain
individuals who are material witnesses in
an ongoing criminal proceeding, provided
their availability cannot otherwise be
guaranteed. That the government also
seeks information about the September
attacks from these individuals does not
invalidate the reasons for their detention.
At the same time, the Justice
Department's recent actions are
undernably preventive, in that detentions,
while legally valid, are being used in
unprecedented numbers to thwart further
terrorist attacks. In directing these actions,
Attorney General John Ashcroft is
assisting President Bush in fulfilling his
constitutional duty to faithfully execute
the laws and to provide for the nation's
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defense. The Supreme Court has
permitted law enforcement to detain
individuals for relatively minor violations
in the course of investigating more
significant crimes. Even under normal
circumstances, the Justice Department --
if a federal court approves -- may detain
without bond criminal defendants who are
a flight risk or who pose a danger to the
community.
These tools are even more vital as the
government pursues the war on terror.
This June, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that
terrorism constituted a special
circumstance, "where special arguments
might be made for forms of preventive
detention and for heightened deference to
the judgments of the political branches
with respect to matters of national
security." The new provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which
permit the indefinite detention of
suspected terrorists pending criminal or
removal proceedings, are consistent with
the discretion afforded the administration
in fighting this unique threat.
Even in this area, however, the Justice
Department's actions, and their effects on
civil liberties, are subject to judicial review.
All individuals arrested or detained,
whether for immigration violations,
criminal offenses, or as material witnesses,
must be brought before a judicial officer
after being taken into custody.
Individuals arrested on criminal charges or
as material witnesses also have the right to
appointed counsel. And although
individuals held on immigration violations
are not entitled to counsel at taxpayer's
expense, they certainly have a right to be
represented by a lawyer. The Justice
Department has provided these detainees
with written information about how to
obtain assistance from aid organizations
that can provide representation. Once
counsel is secured, individuals can
institute habeas corpus proceedings to
challenge the legality of their detention.
Last week's indictment of Zacanas
Moussaoui by a federal grand jury
provides ample proof that preventive
detentions are a vital aspect of the
government's battle against terrorism.
Federal agents arrested Mr. Moussaoui in
August for suspected immigration
violations after the Minnesota flight
school where Mr. Moussaoui was a
student became concerned because he had
no interest in learning to take off or land.
As a result, Mr. Moussaoui -- who may
have intended to be the 20th hijacker on
Sept. 11 -- was in federal custody at the
time of the attacks.
Sixty years ago, Franklin Roosevelt spoke
of a world founded upon four essential
human freedoms. Chief among these was
freedom from fear. Terronsts now pose a
dire threat to this freedom. No one can
dispute the Justice Department's right --
indeed, its obligation -- to use every
legitimate means at its disposal to prevent
further terrorist attacks. Provided the
individuals detamed have access to
counsel, and are treated fairly and with
respect, "preventive detentions" are a
legitimate part of the administration's
efforts to preserve America's freedom
from fear.
Mr. Bell was U.S. attorney general under
President Carter.
Copyright @ 2001, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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Judge: U.S. May Jail Material Witnesses;
N.Y. Ruling Conflicts with Decision in Prior Case in Same Federal District
The Washington Post
July 12, 2002
Steve Fainam
The government may forcibly detain
witnesses to gather evidence in its
nationwide terrorism investigation, a
federal judge ruled today, rejecting as
"flawed" a previous federal ruling that the
tactic is unconstitutional.
The judge, Michael B. Mukasey, ruled that
the Justice Department has legally
imprisoned as "material witnesses" dozens
of men authorities believe may be able to
provide important information to grand
junes investigating terrorism. He refused
to grant the deportation of an unnamed
immigrant who argued he had been
illegally jailed.
On April 30, Shira A. Scheindlin, who like
Mukasey presides in New York's Southern
District, dismissed perjury charges against
a Jordanian college student who had been
"unlawfully detained," ruling that "since
1789, no Congress has granted the
government the authority to imprison an
innocent person" to testify before a grand
jury.
In a 37-page opinion, Mukasey rejected
Scheindlin's ruling, saying that her
interpretation that material witnesses
should be excluded from grand jury
proceedings is "to perceive something that
is not there."
The government has appealed Scheindlin's
ruling to the 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals. Neil S. Cartusciello, who
represented the "John Doe" material
witness before Mukasey, said tonight that
he was "disappointed in the outcome" but
needed to read the decision and consult
with his client before deciding whether to
appeal.
Legal experts said the constitutionality of
the government's use of the material
witness statute is likely to be decided in
the higher courts. "It's not surprising on
an issue like this -- which in Judge
Scheindlin's case was a very new and
different kind of an issue -- that there
would be a difference of interpretations,"
said Neal R. Sonnett, a former assistant
U.S. attorney now in private practice in
Miami.
The government's use of the material
witness statute has been perhaps the most
controversial tactic to detain suspects in
the terrorism investigation. The statute
was last updated by Congress in 1984. It is
designed to allow authorities to detain an
individual believed to hold information
critical to a "criminal proceeding" if the
person cannot be compelled to testify in
any other way.
Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the
statute had been invoked rarely, usually in
cases where a person presented a flight
risk. However, the government appears to
have detained as material witnesses people
it believes may be terrorism suspects or
who may be able to appear before a grand
jury to testify about evidence critical to
the investigation.
Osama Awadallah, the Jordanian student
covered by Scheindlin's ruling, was
arrested as a material witness after
106
Awadalaer he said it as
gh cas 2ly to affect
': 1ight (g 20t2 tTe
107
Judge Orders U.S. to Release Names of 9/11 Detainees
The New York Times
August 3, 2002
Neil A. Lewis
A federal judge ruled today that the Bush
administration had no right to conceal the
identities of hundreds of people arrested
after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, and she
ordered that most of their names be
released within 15 days.
The ruling by Judge Gladys Kessler of
Federal District Court dealt a significant
setback to the government's policy of
secret detentions, mostly of immigrants, in
connection with the Sept. 11 investigation.
Judge Kessler rejected the Justice
Department's arguments that disclosure of
the names would impede its investigation
of terrorists. She said that while it was the
obligation of the executive branch to
ensure the physical security of American
citizens, "the first priority of the judicial
branch must be to ensure that our
government always operates within the
statutory and constitutional constraints
which distinguish a democracy from a
dictatorship."
"Unquestionably," she added, "the public's
interest in learning the identity of those
arrested and detained is essential to
verifying whether the government is
operating within the bounds of law."
Judge Kessler's opinion in the case, which
had been brought by a broad coalition of
groups, including some civil liberties
organizations, was the latest ruling issued
in the handful of cases now making their
way up the federal court system
challenging some of the government's
policies put in place after the Sept. 11
attacks.
In some cases, the courts have been
receptive to the government's arguments,
but in several others judges have resisted
claims of broad executive authority.
In one case, both a district court and an
appeals court panel ruled against the
government in Michigan, saying the
Justice Department could not close
deportation proceedings to the public and
the news media.
The government gained a victory
elsewhere in the courts this week when a
federal judge ruled that the more than 560
prisoners detained at the Guantanamo
Naval Base in Cuba were beyond the
reach of United States courts.
Justice Department officials will probably
ask a federal appeals court to delay Judge
Kessler's ruling from taking effect while it
appeals, but officials there said today that
they had not yet decided to do so.
Nevertheless, Robert McCallum, the
assistant attorney general for the civil
division, had harsh words for Judge
Kessler's ruling.
"The Department of Justice believes
today's ruling impedes one of the most
important federal law enforcement
investigations in history, harms our efforts
to bring to justice those responsible for
the heinous attacks of Sept. 11, and
increases the risk of future terrorist threats
to our nation," Mr. McCallum said.
He said the F.B.I. and the department's
criminal division "firmly believe that the
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information sought by the plaintiffs, if
released, could jeopardize the
investigation and provide valuable
information to terrorists seeking to cause
even greater harm to the safety of the
American people."
The opinion noted that the government
said on Nov. 5 that it had detained 1,182
people in connection with the Sept. 11
investigation. But Judge Kessler suggested
that the numbers were confusing and that
the Justice Department has never given a
full accounting of who had been arrested.
"As of this moment," she said, "the public
does not know how many persons the
government has arrested and detained as
part of its Sept. 11 investigation, nor does
it know who most of them are, where they
are and whether they are represented by
counsel."
Amid the uncertainty, the judge noted that
the Justice Department had provided
some numbers, notably that 751 people
were arrested for immigration violations.
As of June 13, only 74 remained in
custody, the rest having been released or
deported.
That is the category most directly affected
by Judge Kessler's order. If her ruling
stands, the government would have to
release the names of at least those 751,
even those who have left the country.
The government has also said that it
arrested and charged 129 people on
federal criminal charges and that it has
already released those names.
The last category encompasses people
arrested as material witnesses. The
government has never disclosed the
number or identities of those people but it
has been estimated to be about two
dozen, most of whom have been released.
Judge Kessler asked the government to
provide further evidence why the names
of materials witnesses should not be
released.
The suit asking for disclosure of the
immigration detainees' names was brought
by 22 advocacy groups, including the
Center for National Security Studies, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee and People for
the American Way Foundation.
Kate Martin, of the Center for National
Security Studies and the lead lawyer for
those challenging the government's policy,
called the ruling "a vindication of our
basic liberties and a demonstration that
the courts are there to stop government
abuses."
Ms. Martin said it showed that the events
of Sept 11 "may not be used as an excuse
to suspend basic rights."
Although most of the people who would
be affected are no longer in custody, she
said, the ruling still has great value.
"It will prevent the government from
doing this again," she said. "Moreover, it
will give us the information to evaluate
how these people were treated and
whether this was a random roundup of
Arabs and Muslims or a legitimate
targeted investigation of terrorism as the
government has claimed."
The Justice Department had argued that
the disclosure of the names of those
arrested for immigration violations would
hinder the investigation. It would, they
said, reduce the inclination of detainees to
help authorities because the terrorist
groups would intimidate or cut off contact
with them once their names were known.
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Judge Kessler said that argument was
unpersuasive since the terrorist groups
must already know who was arrested as
those in custody have always been free to
disclose their situation to the public.
Judge Kessler dismissed as too speculative
the government's argument that the
release of the names would allow terrorist
groups to track the progress of its
investigation. The government put
forward a so-called "mosaic theory" of the
investigation, arguing that there are bits of
information like the names of the
detainees that may seem useless by
themselves but can form part of a larger,
revealing picture.
Attorney General John Ashcroft has been
the most vocal defender of the
government's refusal to identify everyone
who had been arrested. He has repeatedly
said he was prevented from disclosing the
names because it would violate the privacy
of those arrested.
Judge Kessler said that the government
might ask detainees if any wanted their
name excluded from the list and that if
any asked for confidentiality, it would be
respected.
Copyright © 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Military Tribunals: Swift Judgments in Dire Times
USA Today
November 15, 2001
Joan Biskupic and Richard Willing
President Bush's order allowing military
tribunals to try accused terrorists sets the
stage for something not seen since World
War II: an emergency legal system
designed to biing swift judgment, using
rules that make convictions easier but
deeply worry civil libertarians.
With the Taliban on the run in
Afghanistan and investigators here
continuing to seek possible associates of
the Sept. 11 hijackers, Bush's order is a
signal that the next battlefield in the war
on terrorism will be the courtroom.
The Bush administration defended its
extraordinary order Wednesday, saying
that the shadowy nature of al-Qa'eda
terrorists, who dress as civilians and attack
a nation from within, demands a special
system-of justice that recognizes the needs
of national security and the unusual
threats that terrorists pose. For example,
military tribunals can use secretly collected
wiretap evidence and other confidential
information not admitted in ordinary
trials; secret testimony from informants,
and hearsay evidence.
The foreign terrorists who could be
subjected to such tribunals "don't deserve
to be treated as prisoners of war," Vice
President Cheney said. "They don't
deserve the same guarantees and
safeguards we use for an Amencan
citizen."
It was unclear Wednesday when, or even
if, the Bush administration plans to
empanel a military court, or specifically
whom it might try. Military panels could
be created by Defense Secretary Donald
Rumisfeld to try suspected terronists
wherever they are captured, whether in
Afghanistan, the United States or
elsewhere.
They also could be used to try suspects
already in custody, including at least two
Muslim extremists who authorities say had
contact with the 19 hijackers in the
months leading up to the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Any tribunal could face a legal challenge
from defendants demanding a jury trial in
a public court. But legal precedent is on
Bush's side.
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales
says that Bush's decision to permit the
panels was driven by two considerations:
The need to conduct trials where
terrorists are captured, especially when
returning them to the United States could
pose security risks.
* The need for special trial rules to allow
confidential information gathered by U.S.
intelligence to be used against terrorists
without having the information revealed
in open court.
Because they permit secret testimony,
military tribunals or commissions, as they
also are called, allow prosecutors to
withhold sensitive information that they
would be required to disclose during an
ordinary criminal trial.
Muslim extremists charged with trying to
blow up the World Trade Center in 1993
were tried in federal criminal court. Trial
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records included structural details of the
twin towers, which prosecutors say may
have been used by the Sept. 11 hijackers
to determine the type of jet needed to
knock down the twin towers.
"'The best evidence against a person might
be classified, and to get a conviction we
might need to disclose it," Gonzales says.
Military tribunals are rarely used but are
deeply rooted in U.S. history. They have
withstood federal court challenges in the
19th and 20th centuries, and were
approved unanimously by the Supreme
Court when they last were used during
World War II.
Besides protecting U.S. intelligence
networks, the military tribunals'
advantages include speed. Six German
saboteurs who sneaked into the USA
during World War II were caught, tried
and executed, with time out for a Supreme
Court appeal, during a 7-week period in
1942.
Another advantage, as Cheney indicated,
is that trying terrorists in military court
sends a clear signal that they are
international outlaws, not entitled to even
the rudimentary rights afforded ordinary
prisoners of war.
"This is the answer for what we're dealing
with: unlawful belligerents who do not
come within our constitutional structure,"
says Catholic University law dean Douglas
Kmiec, who supports the use of military
tribunals. "The president's order is not
extraordinary when one places it in the
context of historic military campaigns."
But some members of Congress are
critical of Bush's move. U.S. Rep. John
Conyers, D-Mich., the ranking Democrat
on the House Judiciary Committee, says
military commissions are based on the
"thinnest legal precedents" and could
"antagonize our allies." Senate Judiciary
Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., says he
was left with more questions than answers
by Bush's directive. "We need to
understand the international implications
of the President's order, which sends a
message to the world that it is acceptable
to hold secret trials and summary
executions," Leahy said. Harvard
University law professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter, who has studied tribunals, said:
"President Bush has said this is a war to
bring terrorists to justice. So the real
question is, what's justice? That requires a
fair trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that is not the aim of a military
tribunal." A better option, she says, would
be convening an international war crimes
tribunal.
Bush's order Tuesday was the latest in a
series of administration moves that have
infuriated civil libertarians. It came on the
same day the Justice Department
announced it would try to question more
than 5,000 men who have entered the
country since January 2000 from nations
linked to the al-Qa'eda terrorist network
A week ago, the administration made clear
that it would wiretap prisoners'
conversations with their lawyers if officials
believe the prisoners might be passing on
terrorist information.
"There is a natural temptation to hunker
down whenever we are in crisis," says
New York University law professor
Joshua Rosenkranz. "But there is a danger
that this hysteria-driven effort to protect
to ourselves is weakening the foundations
of our democracy."
Military as judge and jury
Military commissions essentially set their
own rules.
Under Bush's order, the tribunals could sit
at any time and any place. Military officers
would serve as judge and jury, deciding
both the law to be applied and resolving
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disputes over facts that usually are the
domain of a jury.
Instead of a unanimous verdict, the votes
of only two-thirds of the members of a
military panel would be needed to convict
and sentence a defendant, and even
impose the death penalty.
Bush would decide who would be subject
to the tribunal, based on his belief that an
individual is a member of al-Qa'eda or has
committed or helped commit international
terrorism.
The order gives Rumsfeld the power to
detain anyone Bush targets, but also
requires that the suspect be "treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction
based on race, color, religion," and be
"allowed the free exercise of religion."
The president would have the option to
review a verdict and make any final
decision in the case. But any death
sentence would lead to calls for a Supreme
Court review.
Bush dodged one potential legal obstacle
by declaring that the tribunals would not
be used to try U.S. citizens. Two of the
Nazi saboteurs tried during World War II
held American citizenship, and their trials
were complicated by their claims that their
cases should have been handled by a
standard federal court.
Tribunals have precedents
The case involving the Nazi saboteurs had
some parallels with the hijackings. Eight
Germans were dropped off by U-boats on
beaches near Amagansett, N.Y., and
Jacksonville, Fla. The men, all of whom
previously had lived and worked in the
USA, spoke fluent English, wore
American-style clothes and carried
blasting caps and other sabotage tools.
Their instructions, written in invisible ink
on pocket-handkerchiefs, identified
industrial targets in Chicago, Detroit and
New York as well as a network of backers
in the USA.
But the plan began to unravel
immediately, when a Coast Guardsman on
beach patrol encountered some of the
terrorists and heard them speaking
German. The men escaped to New York
City. Fearful that they would be caught,
two of the Germans contacted the FBI
and betrayed the other six.
A week after the arrests, President
Franklin Roosevelt signed an executive
order authorizing a military commission
to try the men. The men turned to the
Supreme Court, citing an 1866 case that
forbade the military trial of any American
civilian while ordinary courts were open.
But the court said the Germans were
"unlawful belligerents" who had entered
the country clandestinely and thus had no
rights to a public trial or a trial by jury.
The men were tried in secret before a
military panel and convicted. The two
who cooperated received prison sentences
and the other six were executed, 7 weeks
after they were captured.
Military trials were common during the
Civil War, when 13,000 soldiers and
civilians were tried before about 5,000
commissions. The most memorable
occurred at the war's end, when eight
civilians with Confederate ties were tried
in May and June 1865 for helping John
Wilkes Booth carry out the assassination
of President Lincoln.
That panel was created by President
Andrew Johnson, Lincoln's successor,
who like President Bush signed an order
based on his law department's
recommendation. Johnson's attorney
general, James Speed, argued that the
assassination was an act of war because
under the Constitution. Lincoln was
commander-in-chief.
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Edward Steers, author of Blood on the
Moon, a history of the assassination, says
Johnson had a more pragmatic reason for
a military trial: avoiding a jury of
Confederate sympathizers who lived in
Washington, which despite being the U.S.
capital essentially was a Southern city.
After a 50-day trial, all eight were found
guilty by a panel of seven generals and
two colonels. By a two-thirds vote, four
defendants were sentenced to hang, and
four others received long prison
sentences. It took less than 3 months
from the time of the assassination for the
sentences to be carried out.
"That's the beauty of the thing . . . from
the government's perspective," says James
Hall, co-author of Come Retribution, a
study of Civil War terrorism. "Things
move quickly, and from a legal standpoint
it's all self-contained."
The Lincoln case also is similar in several
respects to the current situation.
Historians note that Booth and his co-
conspirators intended to kill not just
Lincoln but Vice President Johnson and
Secretary of State William Seward, who
was next in line for the presidency. Had
Johnson and Seward also been killed, the
Constitution as then written made no
provision for choosing a new president.
"It was a formula for civic chaos or
confusion with parallels" to the Sept. 11
attacks, says Michael Maione, historian at
Ford's Theatre, where Lincoln was shot.
As the US. government has done in the
hijacking probe, authorities rounded up
and detained large numbers of potential
suspects. About 200 were arrested and
held, author Michael Kauffman estimates,
in a nation whose population was about
one-ninth what it is now. Federal
investigators have detained and
questioned more than 1,200 in the
investigation of the terrorist attacks.
Little dissent in Congress
To this point, Congress has been largely
mute in response to Bush's plan. Many
members want more details about the
tribunals. Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich.,
chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, said he had concerns about
the order, especially the extent to which
the trials can be kept secret. But the
influential Democrats stopped short of
criticizing the president.
In Washington, investigators pursuing the
hijacking inquiry said the possibility of
military trials gives them one more tool to
persuade persons with knowledge of how
the hijackings were done to talk to
authorities.
The possibility that a potential defendant
may have to face a military panel, said one
veteran investigator, could be a potential
"mind-focuser."
Investigators say at least two men
currently in custody were linked to the
Sept. 11 hijackings but that their
involvement would be difficult to prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard
of an ordinary criminal court.
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen with
ties to radical Muslim groups, was arrested
on immigration charges nearly a month
before the Sept. 11 attacks. He has been
linked to some of the hijackers through
phone intercepts.
A second suspect, pilot Lotfi Raissi, is
believed to have coached the hijackers on
flying techniques before the attacks. He is
being held in London and is fighting
extradition to the United States.
Attorney General John Ashcroft said
Wednesday that Bush's plan recognizes
the potential difficulty in trying terrorism
suspects.
"The United States is in a state of war," he
said. "It's important to give the president
114
* *cQ ' t cna1 ) Inc.
o 01G ne pan y
Coorht
eStates hie
oj the etent bs authooty.
ResbItY cons
U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals; New Rules Also Allow Leeway on Evidence
The Washington Post
March 21, 2002
John Mintz
The Bush administration has settled on a
complex set of military tribunal
regulations more advantageous to al
Qaeda and Taliban defendants than the
guidelines President Bush originally issued
in November, knowledgeable sources said
yesterday.
The new rules would require a unanimous
vote of judges to impose the death penalty
on convicted terrorists -- not the two-
thirds vote Bush had suggested in his
Nov. 13 executive order establishing the
tribunals. And while the president's
original order barred appeals after
conviction, the new regulations allow
military officers to review a tribunal's
decision on appeal.
Yet the new rules, scheduled to be
announced today, also give prosecutors
more leeway than they would have in
criminal courts. Hearsay or secondhand
evidence could be used in the new
tribunals, for example, although it is
barred in ordinary criminal trials and
courts- martial.
Bush's original order brought a barrage of
criticism from human rights groups and
European officials who said it could
violate the rights of suspects brought to
trial by the United States. In the four
months since, experts from the White
House, the Defense Department and the
Justice Department have been slowly
working out the details of what could
become one of the most controversial
aspects of the U.S. war on terrorism.
Despite the furor, many U.S. officials have
concluded that there may be little use for
the tribunals because the great majority of
the 300 prisoners being held at the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are
low-ranking foot soldiers, sources said.
The tribunals are planned only for
relatively high-ranking al Qaeda and
Taliban operatives against whom there is
persuasive evidence of terrorism or war
crimes.
"The world now will begin to see what we
meant by a fair system that will enable us
to bring people to justice [but] at the same
time protect citizenry," Bush told
reporters yesterday.
Administration officials have other plans
for many of the relatively junior captives
now at Guantanamo Bay indefinite
detention without trial. U.S. officials
would take this action with prisoners they
fear could pose a danger of terrorism even
if they have little evidence of past crimes.
Human rights groups expressed differing
opinions about the new tribunal rules. All
contended that some provisions still
violate the rights of prisoners, but some
expressed relief that the regulations had
been softened since Bush announced
them.
The tribunals, sometimes called
"commissions," will resemble military
courts-martial in composition. They will
have three to seven members.
In cases where the death penalty is not a
possibility, defendants can be convicted
by a two-thirds vote. Those convicted in
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tribunals will be allowed to ask a review
panel appointed by the president --
consisting of three people, one of whom
will be a military judge -- to reconsider
their cases. Defendants will not be
allowed to appeal to the federal courts.
The rules of evidence governing cases
before the tribunals will be considerably
looser than they are in U.S. criminal
courts. In ordinary criminal cases, a
witness cannot offer hearsay evidence --
information based on what someone else
has said. But hearsay testimony will be
allowed before military tribunals, sources
said, because the government must show
only that the evidence has "probative
value to a reasonable person."
In criminal trials, prosecutors must
establish a "chain of custody" for
evidence, such as documents or
fingerprints, to prove that police handled
it properly after obtaining it.
But in terrorism cases brought before
tribunals, which may involve papers or
computer disks retrieved by U.S. soldiers
from rubble-strewn al Qaeda hide-outs in
Afghanistan, prosecutors need not
establish chain of custody. "It's not like
we have a crime scene where a bloody
glove got left behind," said one source
knowledgable about the government's
deliberations.
The trials will be open to the public, and
the defendants will be able to hear the
evidence against them. But the hearings
can be closed -- even to the defendants --
if classified information is used or the
discussion could endanger national
security. In such cases, defense lawyers
with security clearances could still be
present, but would not be allowed to
reveal the secrets to their clients.
Any alleged terrorists whom the president
ultimately brings before the new tribunals
likely would face charges of violating the
laws of war, such as conducting hostilities
while posing as a civilian, or committing
crimes against civilians, sources said. Bush
also likely would file conspiracy charges
against such suspects, allowing
prosecutors to use evidence involving one
member of al Qaeda against others.
The human rights group Amnesty
International said the new regulations
violate suspects' rights in many ways. The
worst provision, the group said, is that
convictions could be appealed only to
higher panels also named by the president,
rather than independent judicial bodies --
a practice it said was "deeply troubling."
Human Rights Watch expressed
misgivings about the same provision. "In
America, we've never let our political
leaders decide who is guilty," said the
group's Washington representative, Tom
Malinowski. "That's been a fundamental
principle since 1789."
Even so, he added that the milder rules
"go a long way to meet the concerns of
human rights groups. . . . It will help the
Bush administration climb out of the deep
hole it dug for itself . .. last fall."
Ruth Wedgwood, an international law
expert at Yale University who supports
Bush's plan, said administration officials
have been judicious and concerned with
the nation's security throughout the
process.
"The time [government attorneys] have
taken on this shows the seriousness with
which they were taking on the criticism,"
she said. "This was clearly very carefully
done."
In general, sources said, there will be four
categories of prisoners: those deemed
innocent and released; those repatriated to
their countries for trial; those tried before
military tribunals; and those detained
without charge. Human rights groups
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have expressed concerns about the last
group.
U.S. officials will rely in part on decisions
by European human rights courts that
allowed British authorities to detain Irish
Catholic and Protestant militants for long
periods of time if they were deemed
dangerous but not necessarily guilty of a
crime, sources said. Those courts allowed
the detentions as long as British officials
periodically reviewed the cases.
International law allows for such
indefinite detention only in cases of
national emergency, and administration
attorneys view the current situation -- with
a danger of clandestine terrorists possibly
wielding weapons of mass destruction --
as exactly that, legal sources said.
Another legal precedent for this type of
detention without criminal charge is the
practice of involuntary hospitalization of
mentally ill people who pose a danger to
themselves and others, legal sources said.
"In a state of real emergency, various
liberties can be suspended," said one
attorney who advised the administration
on the rules.
Staff writer Juliet Eilperin contributed to
this report.
Copyright D 2002, The Washington Post
Co..
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Having Their Day in (a Military) Court
NationalReview
December 17, 2001
Robert H. Bork
AT WAR
How best to prosecute terrorists
THE debate over the president's order
creating military tribunals to try suspected
terrorists consists largely of warring
slogans and overripe rhetoric: "shredding
our Constitution," "seizing dictatorial
power," etc., on the one hand, and some
version of "the bastards don't deserve any
better" on the other. Analysis is in short
supply. The issue of the balance between
security and civil liberties will be with us,
in various guises, for a long time to come.
The reality we face means that no
resolution of such issues will be wholly
satisfactory.
When the issue is trying terrorists, there
appear to be only four options: trial in a
federal court; trial before an international
tribunal; trial before a military tribunal; or
setting the captives free. Nobody this side
of a psychiatric ward will choose the last
option. But the first and second don't win
any prizes either.
Trials in federal courts have features that
make them totally inappropriate for the
trial of terrorists. Jurors often respond to
emotional appeals, and, in any event,
would have good reason to fear for their
and their families' safety if they convicted.
Criminal trials have been adorned by
judges with a full panoply of procedural
hurdles that guarantee a trial of many
months. Appeals and petitions for habeas
corpus can take years, and should the
death sentence be given, the ACLU has
shown how to delay execution for ten
years or more through appeals followed
by one habeas corpus petition after
another. An open trial and proceedings of
that length, covered by television, would
be an ideal stage for an Osama bin Laden
to spread his propaganda to all the
Muslims in the world. Many Islamic
governments would likely find that
aroused mobs make it impossible to
continue cooperating with the U.S.
The conclusive argument, however, is that
in open trials our government would
inevitably have to reveal much of our
intelligence information, and about the
means by which it is gathered. Charles
Krauthanmmer notes that in the trial of the
bombers of our embassies in Africa, the
prosecution had to reveal that American
intelligence intercepted bin Laden's
satellite phone calls: "As soon as that
testimony was published, Osama stopped
using the satellite system and went silent.
We lost him. Until Sept. 11." Disclosures
in open court would inform not only
Middle Eastern terrorists but all the
intelligence services of the world of our
methods and sources.
Trials before an international tribunal
would have all of these defects and more.
Picking the members of the court would
itself be a diplomatic nightmare. It would
be politically impossible to keep judges
from Islamic countries off the court. In
the past, moreover, international courts
have often shown a pronounced
antiAmerican bias. Our prosecutor would
be helpless to avoid a propaganda circus
and the disclosure of our intelligence
capabilities and methods. In the end,
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convictions would be highly uncertain,
but, if obtained, impassioned dissents and
the martyrdom of the terrorists would be
certain. We should be wary of
international tribunals in any event since
their establishment seems part of a more
general move to erode U.S. sovereignty by
subjecting our actions to control by other
nations.
Military tribunals avoid or at least mitigate
these problems. Propaganda by televised
speeches would be impossible and any
required disclosure of intelligence
methods and successes would be secret.
Since trials could move far more
efficiently and appeals are cut off by the
president's order, punishment of the guilty
would be prompt. One of the prices we
pay for an all-volunteer military is that for
most Americans their armed forces are an
unknown world about which it is possible
to imagine all sorts of evils; but military
tribunals are not, as they have been called,
"kangaroo courts" or "drumhead
tribunals." Much of the public is probably
frightened by visions of defendants
convicted out of hand and bustled off to
firing squads.
During the Korean War, the officers in
my battalion took turns prosecuting and
defending. (I had a notable lack of success
in both roles.) I sat on the court, and
never saw an innocent man convicted but
did see a guilty man acquitted. (I
prosecuted that one and it still rankles.)
Even then, before the widespread reform
of the military justice system, military
courts manned by officers, in my opinion
and that of many others, were superior to
the run of civilian courts, more scrupulous
in examining the evidence and following
the plain import of the law. If I were
guilty, I would prefer a civilian jury; if
innocent, a military court.
These virtues would be irrelevant if
military tribunals were of dubious
constitutionality. They are not. The
constitutional issue reached the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Quirin (1942). German
saboteurs had entered the United States
illegally to destroy war industries and
facilities. Arrested by the FBI before they
could act, they sought to file for writs of
habeas corpus, contending they had a
right to trial before regular courts rather
than a military commission. The
presidential proclamation establishing the
commission denied them access to those
courts.
The Court denied the petition, judging it
irrelevant that one of the defendants
might be an American citizen. In its
decision, the Court made clear the
separate constitutional tracks of the two
forms of justice: "Presentment by a grand
jury and trial by a jury ... were at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution
familiar parts of the machinery for
criminal trials in the civil courts. But they
were procedures unknown to military
tribunals which are not courts in the sense
of the judiciary Articles" of the
Constitution. Consistent with that
understanding, military tribunals have
been used by several presidents in time of
war. In the Revolutionary War, before
there was a Constitution, George
Washington employed such tribunals
freely, as did Abraham Lincoln in the Civil
War, and Franklin Roosevelt in World
War II. We remember the Nuremberg
trial, with many of the trappings of a
civilian court, as an attempt (failed in my
view) to establish an international rule of
law in open proceedings. That trial is not a
model for the problem we face now.
There were, of course, no problems of
intelligence disclosures, but, more
important, the open trial was not regarded
by the allies as the only, or in all cases the
preferred, method of proceeding.
According to Mark Martins, a respected
scholar and military lawyer, "German
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regular army soldiers were also defendants
in many of the thousands of military
courts and commissions convened by the
Allies after the war in different zones of
occupation."
If there is a problem with Bush's order, it
is the exemption of U.S. citizens from
trials before military tribunals. Quirin held
that Americans can be tried there, and it is
clear that they should. The trial of
American terrorists in criminal court
would pose all the problems of trying
foreign terrorists there: The prosecution
would have to choose between
safeguarding our intelligence capacity and
trying the terrorist. The terrorists could
well go free.
Contrary to some heated reactions,
military tribunals are well within our
tradition. They are needed now more than
ever.
Mr. Bork, an NR contributing editor, has
been a Marine, lawyer, law professor,
solicitor general, acting attorney general,
and judge.
Copyright 2001 0 National Review, Inc.
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Justice Can't Be Done in Secret: Why Public and Press Have a Right to Witness
Proceedings of Military Tribunals.
The Nation
June 10, 2002
Edward J. Klaris
On March 21, the Defense Department
issued its long-awaited regulations
governmg the trials of alleged terrorists in
military tribunals. The regulations answer
some of the criticisms raised against the
preliminary order issued by the Bush
Administration in November. The
government will, for example, permit
defendants to have court-appointed
military lawyers, defendants will be
presumed innocent until proven guilty and
death-penalty sentences must now be
unanimous. On the key question of
whether trials will be held in secret,
however, the government answered its
critics somewhat misleadingly. The
regulations do state that trials should be
open, but they also give the judges
complete discretion to close the
proceedings to the press and public for
just about any reason. The regulations also
stress that "no provision in this Order
shall be construed to be a requirement of
the United States Constitution."
President George W. Bush is determined
to use military tribunals rather than federal
courts to try noncitizen terrorists either in
this country or abroad. According to
recent reports, one reason to favor
military tribunals is that the government is
hoping to obtain convictions without
having specific evidence that the
defendants engaged in war cnimes,
something a federal court would require.
But even if military tribunals are used to
avoid certain evidentiary requirements
against noncitizen defendants, there is no
good reason for the President to abandon
the delicate balance federal courts have
struck between the First Amendment
right of the press and public to observe
criminal trials and the government's desire
to protect classified information.
Military tribunals have been used
periodically throughout US history, and
the Supreme Court during the Civil War
and World War II was asked to decide
whether the President had the power to
create these tribunals under his
constitutional authority during times of
war. Those Supreme Court cases--some of
which upheld the wartime powers of
Presidents to create tribunals and one that
held after the Civil War that President
Lincoln had exceeded his powers--have
looked at the impact on the constitutional
rights of the defendants. No court has
ever considered the constitutional rights
of the press and public to attend and
report on proceedings in military
tribunals.
Public criminal trials are so commonplace
in our society that few think twice about
the rights underlying this openness. When
they do, the criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial usually
comes to mind. However, it is now
beyond dispute that a separate right of
access to attend trials also arises from the
First Amendment. That right to attend
criminal proceedings--which belongs to
the press and public, not to the
defendants-- mandates that trials be open,
absent compelling and clearly articulated
reasons for closing them. This
independent constitutional right of access
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was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia. In that case, the Court held
that an order closing the courtroom for
the trial was unconstitutional, noting the
public policy reasons behind the rule:
"When a shocking crime occurs, a
community reaction of outrage and public
protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion." In describing the
need for open criminal proceedings,
Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law
School wrote: "The courthouse is a
'theatre of justice,' wherein a vital social
drama is staged; if its doors are locked, the
public can only wonder whether the
solemn ntual of communal condemnation
has been properly performed."
The United States Court of Military
Appeals has also recognized the
constitutional right of access, mandating
the same test for closure in courts-martial
as applied by federal courts: "where the
state attempts to deny the right of access
in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown
that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest." In
both federal courts and courts-martial it is
now clear that these rights belong to the
public, not to the government or the
defendant, and are fundamentally
necessary for the effective functioning of
our cnrminal justice system. Neither the
defendant nor the government nor both
jointly can shield a proceeding from
public view without meeting the stringent
constitutional test.
Military tribunals are the functional
equivalent of federal courts and courts-
martial in terms of the press and public's
right of access. The tribunals will act as a
"theatre of justice" where those who
allegedly sought to terronize and
undermine the United States will be tried.
While the defendants may not have
constitutional rights because they are
noncitizens captured abroad, the press
and public do not give up their rights
based solely on the forum chosen by the
President. The nght of access, though, is
not absolute. There are many rules federal
judges follow that balance the right of
access against the need for closure--for
example, when national security
information might be revealed in court. If
the typical First Amendment guidelines
are applied in the military tribunals,
classified information will be shielded
from improper disclosure and appropriate
access will be provided the press and
public.
Terrorists, hijackers, spies, mobsters, drug
dealers and others have all been tried in
open federal court, where the First
Amendment applies, in cases involving
serious national security concerns, without
classified information being leaked.
Federal judges routinely close the
proceedings for a limited time when
classified information is introduced into
evidence. The Classified Information
Procedure Act permits prosecutors to
keep from defendants and the public
certain sensitive information, and federal
judges must defer to the government's
reasonable concerns about national
secunty.
The most recent federal prosecution of
terronsts is an example of how a court
effectively handled national security
information while balancing the press and
public's First Amendment rights of access.
In early 2001 Judge Leonard Sand in New
York presided over a trial of four
members of Al Qaeda, who were jointly
charged with Osama bin Laden in a far-
reaching conspiracy that spanned at least
ten years. The conspiracy culminated in
the truck-bombing of the United States
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embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998,
when 224 people, including twelve
Americans, were killed and more than
4,500 others injured.
Once the trial began, Judge Sand balanced
the need for secrecy with the First
Amendment requirement that the trial
must, except in extraordinary
circumstances, be open to the public. Jury
selection, for example, was closed, based
on the court's determination that
openness would discourage prospective
jurors from being candid about their
views of capital punishment. Judge Sand
also ruled that for their own protection
the identity of the jurors would not be
released. Similarly, when an FBI
informant took the witness stand, the
judge ordered the courtroom artists not to
sketch him. Judge Sand closed the
courtroom so that two secret plea
agreements could be reached; he sealed
documents and heard secret testimony
about the jail conditions of the Al Qaeda
defendants. As a result, no classified
information was leaked.
The press, which inserted itself into the
case by filing motions with Judge Sand for
access, criticized even these restrictions on
First Amendment grounds. In a trial that
involved four months of testimony,
ninety-two witnesses called by the
prosecution and more than 1,300 exhibits,
the actual limitations on access were
minimal. The constitutional balance
between access and protection of national
security information was maintained.
Several other federal trials have handled
similar secrecy concerns. The 1991-92 trial
of former Panama dictator Gen. Manuel
Antonio Noriega involved undercover
government agents, secret investigative
techniques and other classified
information. The judge occasionally sealed
evidence, did not permit evidence to be
introduced and sometimes ruled that
evidence should come into open court.
Despite the intricacy and sensitivity of the
underlying issues, the trial was open and
the public was able "to participate in and
serve as a check upon the judicial
process," wrote the trial court in its
opinion. Acknowledging the importance
of an open trial in a "controversial" case
such as this one, the judge wrote that he
had specifically "sought to make public all
aspects of these proceedings to the extent
legally permissible."
Similarly, Oklahoma City bomber
Timothy McVeigh was tried and
convicted in open federal court with
classified information shielded from
improper disclosure. From the outset,
publicity was pervasive and intense.
Massive amounts of secret government
materials were introduced as evidence,
including more than 10,000 FBI interview
reports. The news media sought access to
a variety of documents that had been filed
under seal. Balancing the interests of
secrecy and openness, Judge Richard
Matsch condemned the "routine practice
of sealing documents without adequate
recognition of the public interest," and he
granted access to some of the documents
sought. The trial itself was open to the
public. To protect the jury, the judge had
a custom-built wall erected between them
and spectators. He scrambled juror
numbers so that the public could not
match individual jurors with the answers
given to questions during voir dire and
kept the identity of individual jurors
confidential. Each of these actions was
challenged by a coalition of seventy press
representatives at the time, but citing juror
safety and privacy, the judge refused to
budge.
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing
cases also raised serious national security
concerns that had to be weighed against
the public and press's rights of access.
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Once again, the federal judge was able to
strike that balance without any leak of
national security information.
All of these examples of successful federal
court prosecutions should reassure the
Bush Administration that it too can apply
the First Amendment right of access to its
military tribunals without threatening
national security. By issuing regulations
that give the tribunals more discretion
than the First Amendment permits and by
specifically stating that the Constitution
does not apply in the tribunals, the
President may repeat some of the
mistakes of his predecessors in the use of
such tribunals. During the Civil War, for
example, secret military tribunals, rather
than civilian courts, were used as part of a
broader campaign of the Lincoln
Administration to quash public dissent
and to try to punish civilians who
criticized the federal government or the
war.
A military tribunal was used again in 1942
by President Franklin Roosevelt to try
eight German saboteurs who plotted
terrorist attacks strikingly similar to Al
Qaeda's in 2001. The Nazis planned to
destroy key railroad installations,
aluminum factories, power plants, bridges
and canal locks, plus targets such as
Jewish-owned department stores. That
case more than any other points up how
secrecy breeds corruption and contempt
of justice. All of the saboteurs were found
guilty; six were executed and two were
sentenced to life in prison.
J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, was
heralded for his swift capture of the
Germans. The military proceedings were
kept so secret that prior to the start of the
trial officials would confirm neither the
exact location nor the start date of the
trial. Once it began there were only terse
statements after each day's proceedings
and a single visit by the press to the
courtroom when the trial was suspended.
There was a great deal of speculation in
the press about the trial. But because it
was closed, no informed opinions about
the strength of the government's case
could be formed.
After the war, when Harry Truman was
President, his Attorney General, Tom
Clark, decided to open the files of the
secret trial. It turned out that the two
saboteurs who were given lengthy
sentences, George Dasch and Ernst
Burger, hated the Nazi regime and had left
Germany expressly determined to expose
the plot. Soon after they landed on the
beach in Amagansett, Long Island, Dasch
and Burger phoned the FBI in New York
They went to Hoover's Washington
office, revealed the plot in full and
explained how and why they had led the
real saboteurs into the trap.
William Turner, one of Hoover's veteran
FBI agents, later wrote: "Ironically,
[Dasch] is most probably an authentic
American war hero, responsible for saving
many lives. But fate had made him a
threat to the FBI's public image." As
Lloyd Cutler, former White House
counsel under Bill Clinton and a junior
member of the prosecution team,
explained it to the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution in 1980, "I think the major
reason the trial was kept secret, was the
fact that it wasn't the FBI that had done
the real work in capturing the Nazis." Had
the trial been open, the military officials
who presided over the tribunal would
have been hard pressed to convict Dasch
and Burger. But it was not, and the
damage to these two men was devastating.
According to a series of articles published
in 1980 by the Journal-Constitution, two
years after Dasch and Burger arrived in
prison, there was a not because the
prisoners objected to being housed with
Nazis and Dasch was almost thrown off
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the roof of the penitentiary. Dasch was
then transferred to solitary confinement at
Leavenworth, Kansas, forbidden to have
even a pencil. In April 1948 both Dasch
and Burger were granted executive
clemency and deported. Dasch, forced to
return to Germany, was branded both a
Nazi criminal and a traitor to the
fatherland in the magazine Der Stem. His
hometown paper, in a front-page article,
dubbed him "The Judas of Speyer." Dasch
tried to return to the United States many
times during his lifetime but was never
permitted to. He died in Germany in
1991.
History shows that giving unfettered
discretion to the executive branch to
capture, prosecute and try defendants
without public scrutiny is likely to yield
results that will be questioned for years to
come and set a precedent for further
incursions on individual liberties. Whether
the Administration or the officers
presiding over the military tribunals will
comply with First Amendment
requirements affirmed by the Supreme
Court remains an open question, but so
far the message the President has sent is
that he does not have to. Since September
11, the Bush Administration has pursued a
secretive legal strategy. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service continues to
detain secretly hundreds of aliens rounded
up after September 11 whose links to the
terrorist plot, if any, have not been
explained. Without public announcement,
for example, on September 21, 2001, the
country's chief immigration judge, Michael
Creppy, who is appointed by the Attorney
General and comes under the executive
branch of government, issued a
memorandum ordering that immigration
hearings designated by the Justice
Department be kept secret, with court
officials forbidden even from confirming
that cases exist.
Since September 11, civil rights groups
and news organizations have sued the
federal government for blocking press and
public access to immigration proceedings
and detentions. In one case, decided on
April 3, in which the Detroit Free Press
and Ann Arbor News filed suit seeking
access to deportation proceedings of a
Detroit-area Muslim leader, the court held
that the government had violated the First
Amendment by excluding the press and
public. On March 6 another suit was
brought by the New Jersey Civil Liberties
Union, the Center for Constitutional
Rights and other legal groups challenging
the government's closed immigration
hearings; and in late February a federal
judge in California declined to permit civil
rights groups to obtain a list of Afghan
detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
The State Department has repeatedly
criticized secret military tribunals in other
countries, and with good reason. The
public policy rationale the Supreme Court
has used in expanding the First
Amendment right of access is that just
results come from openness. Secrecy does
little more than cloak potential corruption,
foment distrust and prevent the
community from seeing justice done. The
President, even in a time of war, may not
alter that equation by simply changing the
forum in which defendants are tried from
courts to tribunals. If asked, the Supreme
Court should find that the public and
press have a First Amendment right of
access to military tribunals as well.
Edward J. Klaris is general counsel of The
New Yorker.
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Supreme Court Blocks Limit on Secret Hearings
The Boston Globe
June 29, 2002
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court took its first action in
the war on terrorism yesterday, showing a
reluctance to restrict the Bush
adninistration's wide-ranging use of
government authority to deal with the
individuals detained since the Sept. 11
attacks.
In a brief order without explanation, the
justices blocked temporarily a month-old
order by a federal judge in Newark that
had kept the government from holding
secret immigration hearings for hundreds
of detainees.
The Justice Department has set up
"special interest" hearings for those held
on immigration charges and being
detained for investigation of terrorism.
But it has not said who among those
being held fall within that category and its
scope. It has identified no one being held,
and has not said when or where any
hearings have been or would be held. Civil
rights groups have said that more than
700 detainees may be affected.
All such hearings are closed, and no
information about them is to be disclosed
publicly, under a Justice Department
order issued by the chief immigration
judge, Michael Creppy. "No visitors, no
family, and no press" could be admitted,
the order said.
After New Jersey news media were barred
from some of those hearings, they
obtained an order May 28 from Chief US
District Judge John W. Bissell in Newark
that narrowed the government's authority
to proceed in secret. His order did not
require public hearings in any given case,
but nor did it allow the automatic closing
of every such hearing.
Instead, Bissell ruled that the news media
and the public have a right to attend those
hearings, but could be excluded if the
hearing officer makes findings, one case at
a time, that a secret hearing is necessary in
a particular case to serve the government's
need to continue investigating terrorism.
The judge refused to postpone his order
to give the Justice Department time to
appeal. The department then asked the US
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Philadelphia, to block Bissell's order until
the appeals court could review it. The
appeals court also refused.
Administration lawyers, using urgent
claims of a threat to the terrorist
investigation, then asked the Supreme
Court to put Bissell's order on hold until
department challenges can be heard on
appeal, first in the appeals court and
perhaps the Supreme Court.
It is rare for the Supreme Court to step in
and block a lower court order when a
similar request has been turned down by
all the lower court judges involved. But
yesterday the Supreme Court set aside
Bissell's order until the appeals court in
Philadelphia has issued a final ruling on
the government challenge. There
apparently was no dissent.
The Supreme Court has been prepared to
act quickly on the variety of challenges to
the Bush administration's response to the
terrorist attacks. In the immigration
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hearings case, the justices acted two days
after all of the legal papers on that issue
had been filed.
Besides issuing the order delaying the
prospect of any public immigration
hearings in the terrorist probe, the court
yesterday granted review of another
immigration dispute that apparently has
nothing to do with the war on terror.
That case involves a South Korean who
has been permanently admitted to the
United States but faces deportation after
being convicted in California of burglary
and theft. The issue in his case is the
constitutionality of a federal law that bars
the release on bond of a convicted
individual until after their deportation
proceeding is completed.
A federal appeals court ruled that it is
unconstitutional to deny release of a
permanent resident alien. The Justice
Department then appealed that ruling to
the Supreme Court. A final ruling is
expected next spring.
Copyright D 2002. Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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Ruling Favors Limited Access to 9/11 Data
The New York Times
July 13, 2002
Benjamin Weiser
A federal judge, acknowledging national
security concerns, ruled yesterday that the
government should have a say in what is
turned over to the families that have sued
airlines, security firms, and others in the
aftermath of the Sept. 11 terror attacks.
The judge, Alvin K. Hellerstein of Federal
District Court in Manhattan, ordered a
temporary halt to the progress of the
lawsuits until the government and lawyers
for the families come up with a way to
screen information and satisfy the
government's concerns that sensitive
material is not disclosed.
In their suits, the families' lawyers have
been seeking records involving airline
security and other information that could
expose the vulnerabilities or failures of the
airlines, airports, and government
agencies.
Government officials had cited "grave
national security concerns" that
information might be disclosed in the
pretrial stages of the suits that could
compromise security and public safety.
They said that commercial air carriers and
their contractors possessed information
about anti-terronst measures that would
remain effective only if the measures were
closely held, and disclosing them could
"endanger the traveling public."
In court yesterday, Judge Hellerstein
agreed, saying the government "has a very
important voice" that should be heard in
the case. "It's very clear to me that
intervention is appropriate," he said.
He also advised plaintiffs' lawyers to begin
obtaining government security clearances,
which would allow them to see highly
sensitive data. "They'll want access to
information you won't be happy to give
out," the judge told Daniel S. Alter, a
lawyer for the government.
Mr. Alter, an assistant United States
attorney in Manhattan who said he was
representing the Transportation Security
Administration, cautioned that there
might be materials that were "so sensitive"
that they "can't be released."
Security clearances for lawyers are unusual
but not unprecedented in sensitive court
matters. Such clearances were required,
for example, for defense lawyers in last
year's embassy bombings trial in New
York.
After yesterday's hearing, one plaintiff's
lawyer, John A. Greaves, said he was
satisfied that the process ordered by the
judge would not allow the government to
make a unilateral decision on what
information could be kept from plaintiffs.
"Our big concern was we don't want them
to have carte blanche," Mr. Greaves said.
He added that decisions would be made
on a case-by-case basis as to what could
be disclosed. But even with a system in
place, he said, he would not hesitate to go
to the judge if he felt the government was
being too restnctive.
Before the hearing, Ellen Mariani, whose
husband, Louis, also known as Neil, was
on the flight that crashed into the south
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tower of the World Trade Center, said, "I
want the truth."
She continued, "I don't feel that anybody
should be sifting portions out of my court
lawsuit. If they have nothing to hide, bring
it out into the open."
But reached by phone at her New
Hampshire home last night, she said she
had left court with a much better feeling.
"I think he's going to be very fair," she
said of the judge. "I watched him. I
looked at his eyes. I came out with a much
better feeling."
She added, "He laid down the rules, the
ground rules, and I didn't think it was
unfair at all."
The prospect that the parties might soon
begin to exchange information before
trial, a process known as discovery,
prompted lawyers for families who have
not yet decided whether to sue to ask that
the pace be slowed somewhat.
The lawyers told the judge that in many
cases their clients had not yet decided
whether to sue or to take part in the
federal Victim Compensation Fund,
which was established as an alternative to
litigation.
Through the fund, families may be eligible
for payments of more than $1 million
without the usual delays, costs, or
challenges of proving a legal case. But
people who sue could theoretically win
higher damages, while facing the typical
risk of long court battles, or winning
nothing.
In a separate matter, Judge Hellerstein
said that two plaintiffs who were suing
under pseudonyms should use their actual
names.
Their lawyer cited privacy reasons, saying
the two had received constant calls from
the news media. But the judge said he
viewed a lawsuit as a "public event."
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